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MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING, ANTITRUST LAW, AND
TEAM SPORTS: THE CONTINGENT CHOICE OF A BROAD
EXEMPTION
MICHAEL C. HARPER"
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-four years after pronouncing that "Congress[ ,]...
not... this Court[, must remedy] any inconsistency or illogic" in
the long standing exemption of baseball, but not other sports
from the reach of the antitrust laws,' the Supreme Court last
term reduced substantially the uniqueness of Major League
Baseball's control over its labor market. The Court did so not by
exposing baseball to antitrust attack, but rather by clarifying
that restrictions on player labor mobility and freedom of contract
imposed by all North American leagues of professional sports
teams2 also enjoy an exemption from antitrust scrutiny as long
as their labor markets are subject to collective bargaining.3
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,4 the Court held that employers
could conspire and agree to take actions to impose controls on a
labor market, if those actions "grew out of and were "directly
related to" a multiemployer bargaining process, did not 'offend
the federal labor laws that sanction and regulate the process,
affected terms of employment subject to compulsory bargaining,
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank for their
comments on earlier drafts of this Article Joseph Brodley, Samuel Estreicher, Jack
Beermann, and participants in the Boston University School of Law workshop series.
I also wish to thank the Law School for research grants in support of my writing.
1. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972).
2. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2127 (1996).
3. See id.
4. Id.
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and concerned only parties to the collective bargaining relation-
ship.5 All major professional team sports clubs have joined with
other league clubs to bargain in multiemployer units with un-
ions representing the athletes that they employ. As long as a
multiemployer bargaining relationship exists, league-imposed
restraints on player labor markets should easily meet the
Court's other conditions. The Brown holding, therefore, effective-
ly enables leagues in every sport to be as free of antitrust con-
straints in order to control player mobility and salaries as Major
League Baseball has been under its special, long standing anti-
trust exemption.
How one greets Brown inevitably will depend in part on how
one views the antitrust challenges that players have made
against such league-imposed labor market restraints as restric-
tions on mobility between teams,' rookie drafts,8 and salary
caps.' Those individuals who think that the antitrust laws
should be concerned only with restraints on product markets,
and not with restraints on input markets in general or with la-
bor markets in particular, may welcome Brown's exemption of
5. See id.
6. Senators and Members of Congress can no longer claim that baseball's anoma-
lous exemption imposes any special duty on baseball owners to compromise in nego-
tiations with the baseball players' union. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Congressmen
Pledge to Revoke Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1994, at 1.
Eliminating the exemption without also overturning Brown will not pose an antitrust
threat.
7. See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir.
1979) (finding the National Hockey League's free agent compensation system to be
exempt from antitrust challenge because the system was a product of arm's-length,
collective negotiations); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621-23
(8th Cir. 1976) (upholding a district court's finding that a National Football League
(NFL or "the League") rule requiring compensation for a team's signing of a veteran
free agent from another team violated antitrust law under "Rule of Reason" analy-
sis).
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(upholding a finding that the NFL rookie draft violated antitrust law under "Rule of
Reason" analysis).
9. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 691 (2d Cir.
1995) (finding the NBA's revenue sharing and salary cap system, as well as its rook-
ie draft, to be exempt from antitrust challenge because each system arose out of
collective bargaining with players); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954,
962 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding the NBA's salary cap system to be exempt from antitrust
challenge because the system was embodied in a collective bargaining agreement).
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labor market restraints."0 Those individuals who think that the
labor market restraints typically imposed by sports leagues are
reasonable under an antitrust analysis that weighs heavily the
contributions of such restraints to maintaining athletic balance
that enhances the league's competitiveness with other forms of
entertainment also may welcome the decision." Others who be-
lieve that the antitrust laws should protect a player's negotia-
tion of a free-market wage for any extraordinary services the
player provides should give Brown a cold reception. This should
be true for those concerned with the ultimate impact on the
sports product of restraints discouraging talent development 2
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry II & Donald E. Knebel, Antitrust and Employer Re-
straints in Labor Markets, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 173, 184 (1984) (arguing that the
Sherman Act was not intended to cover restraints on labor markets).
11. See, e.g., JESSE W. MARKHAM & PAUL V. TEPLiZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND
PuBLic PoLIcy 99-115 (1981); Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the La-
bor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PrIr. L. REV. 337, 386-87 (1986).
12. The argument that consumer welfare is harmed by agreements among profes-
sional sports clubs to restrain the salaries of the athletes whom they employ runs
as follows: the wages that clubs would be willing to pay in competition for players
in an unrestrained market would reflect the real worth of the players to those who
purchase the clubs' products, either by attending games, watching or listening to
broadcasts, or buying related merchandise. See infra note 255. Depressing wages
below the competitive level would discourage some potential players from becoming
professionals. Even if few potential players have alternative opportunities outside
their sport, a reduction in salary levels at the least reduces the incentive for some
young people to invest the human capital necessary to become a skilled professional
and thereby subtracts from maximum potential consumer satisfaction. See ROGER D.
BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 72-75
(1993). Professional sports clubs collectively are monopsonists in that they are "single
buyer[s] of a well-specified good or service." Id. at 3. Blair and Harrison explain that
even when those selling goods or services to monopsonists will not vary supply in
the short run in response to price reductions, "consumers are hurt because the
producers' profits are reduced and their response may be to reduce future supply."
Id. at 72-73.
The foregoing argument can be challenged along several lines. First, professional
sports clubs enjoy some degree of monopoly power in their product markets within
particular regions. See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASE-
BALL 194 (1989). The high salaries that clubs are willing to pay their players, there-
fore, derive substantially from monopoly profits that do not fully reflect the value
that sports consumers would place on seeing and rooting for the players in fully
competitive product markets. See infra note 255. Labor negotiations in sports, to an
extent, concern the division of returns in excess of those necessary to induce capital
investment. See infra note 255.
Second, the hiring of a star player by a particular club not only creates con-
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and for those concerned with insuring the extraction of a "just"
wage for labor from a cartel of employers."
Regardless of their inclinations on these ultimate issues of
antitrust law, however, both sports fans and lawyers (including
those who are both), have reason to lament the result in Brown.
For reasons elucidated in the final section of this Article,'4
sports fans interested primarily in uninterrupted presentations
of athletic competition are likely to be disappointed by more
work stoppages in professional sports as a result of Brown. For
lawyers, whether sports fans or not, the Brown decision should
be most troubling because it failed to provide a proper clarifica-
tion of how antitrust law should accommodate federal labor law.
sumer welfare for the fans of that club, it also subtracts somewhat from the welfare
of the fans of competitive clubs. Cf. MARKHAM & TEPLITZ, supra note 11, at 21 (dis-
cussing the interdependence of baseball clubs with respect to team quality). This
subtraction is an external effect that the hiring club does not take into account
when calculating the worth of a star player. But cf infra note 255 (noting that
interclub mobility of athletes heightens players' value for fans). This effect is rele-
vant to other labor markets, as well as the many product markets that are influ-
enced by snobbery and other forms of peer comparison, but probably not to as great
extent as the labor market for players for competing teams. See id.
Finally, confident predictions cannot be made concerning the effect of salary re-
ductions resulting from particular labor market restraints on the number and quality
of potential athletes who choose to develop their skills. As long as a few star play-
ers can secure multimillion dollar contracts, see infra note 269 and accompanying
text, it may be that some reduction in average player salaries will affect the invest-
ments in skill development of few young athletes, especially given the economic al-
ternatives that these athletes confront.
Although each of these arguments can in turn be individually challenged, suffice
it to say here that those who believe that antitrust law should be available to chal-
lenge particular restraints on sports labor markets generally can respond that the
antitrust laws presume that market restraints lead to inefficiency and a reduction in
consumer welfare. But cf BLAIR & HARRISON, supra, at 111 (noting that nonstatuto-
ry exemption "probably lowers the transaction costs of reaching agreements in indus-
tries in which there are a great number of employers"). This presumption at least
warrants empirical analysis, perhaps through litigation, of whether particular re-
straints are justified. Speculative arguments, like the three suggested above, thus
should be incorporated into an analysis of particular restraints, rather than be used
as a blanket excuse for any kind of sports labor market restraint.
13. For arguments that the antitrust laws have distributive as well as efficiency
goals, see, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982), and Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Chal-
lenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
14. See infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
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The accommodation that Brown did articulate sacrificed anti-
trust goals to a degree unnecessary to the service of labor law
goals.
As explained more fully below, in order to protect established
and legally approved multiemployer collective bargaining in
myriad industries other than sports, the Court properly rejected
the players' lawyers' formulation of a limited antitrust exemp-
tion that would not have protected the concerted employer action
challenged in Brown. 5 The Court, however, could have found
that the challenged concerted action in Brown was not exempt
from antitrust challenge under a different theory that would not
have threatened multiemployer bargaining in any industry. That
theory would have distinguished between joint employer actions
in most industries designed to resist union efforts to use collec-
tive employee power to obtain supracompetitive wages, and
those joint employer actions, as in the sports industry, unilater-
ally to impose restraints on free, individual employee bargain-
ing.
As a result of Brown, individuals whose special, differentiated
talent would enable them to achieve extraordinary wages in a
free, competitive labor market will have to make an unnecessary
choice between two sets of statutory rights, those secured by
federal labor laws and those secured by antitrust laws. In the
near term, this choice may be imposed only on professional ath-
letes, who both are interested in the benefits of multiemployer
collective bargaining and also confront joint employer schemes to
restrict their labor market. 6 In the longer term, however, the
choice demanded by Brown may also unnecessarily and improp-
erly constrain others with differentiated talent in the entertain-
ment industry. Moreover, the Court's failure in Brown to clarify
the extent to which labor law requires the accommodation of
antitrust law could lead to a further unnecessary expansion of
the labor exemption and consequential sacrifice of antitrust goals.
15. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2123-27 (1996).
16. See Michael S. Hobel, Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expi-
ration of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. RBv.
164, 169 n.11 (1982).
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II.
The Brown case involved a challenge under section 1 of the
Sherman Act 7 to the NFL's 1989 imposition on its twenty-eight
member clubs of a flat wage of exactly $1000 per week for any
player employed by any member club on a "developmental
squad." 8 In the spring of 1989, while attempting to negotiate a
new collective bargaining agreement with the NFL Players Asso-
ciation (NFLPA), the NFL proposed that each team establish a
squad of up to six rookie, or first-year, players to play in practice
games, and perhaps in regular games, when regular team mem-
bers were injured. 9 At the same time, the NFL proposed that
each team would pay all developmental squad players the same
$1000 weekly salary.0 The NFLPA refused to agree to the fixed
salary level; it insisted that developmental squad players receive
the same benefits and protections afforded other NFL players,
"includ[ing] the right to negotiate their own salaries."2 After
two months, the NFL declared negotiations over the issue of
developmental squad salaries to be at an impasse and, without
the agreement of the union, unilaterally implemented the $1000
weekly salary.22 The NFL advised each club that any deviations
from this pay rate would result in disciplinary action by the
League, including the loss of draft choices.'
Two hundred thirty-five players who were employed on the
developmental squads and who received the $1000 weekly wage
during the 1989 season initiated the Brown litigation in 1990.'
17. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "[elvery contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Supreme Court has applied this provision against agreements
between buyers to restrain trade in an input market. See Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-44 (1948) (holding that an
agreement among sugar refiners to set price offers for sugar beets violated the
Sherman Act); Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1926) (holding
that an agreement among owners of merchant marine vessels to impose uniform
terms and conditions of employment violated the Sherman Act).
18. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Joint Appendix at 18, Brown (No. 95-388).
22. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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The players claimed that the member clubs of the NFL con-
spired to restrain trade unreasonably in violation of the
Sherman Act by agreeing, through their association in the NFL,
to pay the same wage and therefore not to compete for develop-
mental squad players.' The district court rejected the NFL's
and its member clubs' defense that their joint imposition of the
flat wage was exempt from antitrust challenge.26 The Court
then granted summary judgment to the players on the issue of
antitrust liability,27 and after trial of the damages issue to a
jury, entered judgment on an award of treble damages that
exceeded thirty million dollars.'
The district court's decision to reject the claim of an antitrust
exemption should not have surprised the NFL. The Supreme
Court previously had confirmed two bases for exempting labor
market restraints from the reach of the antitrust laws,29 but
neither exemption directly fit the owners' unilateral imposition
of the flat weekly wage on the developmental squad players. At
the time of the district court's ruling no lower court had inter-
preted either exemption broadly enough to cover this imposition.
The Supreme Court established the first of the two exemp-
tions in 1941. In United States v. Hutcheson," Justice Frank-
furter interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193231 to pro-
vide labor unions with a broad exemption from the Sherman
Act, allowing them to engage in economic pressure "[slo long as
a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups."32 Hutcheson was important because it ensured
that workers, through their unions, could conspire together to
engage in any form of economic pressure, whether "licit" or "illic-
it," in attempts to achieve enhanced wages or to negotiate other
terms of employment without being vulnerable to treble damag-
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc, 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2942, 2948-50 (D.D.C. 1992).
28. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 50 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
29. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
30. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994).
32. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232.
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es, injunctions, or criminal prosecutions under the antitrust
laws. Unions thought that they had achieved this kind of insula-
tion with the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914,"3 but prior to
Hutcheson the Court had interpreted the exemption of union
economic weapons set forth in section 20 of that Act to be lim-
ited to union activities directed against an employer by its own
employees.' In Hutcheson, Justice Frankfurter held that Con-
gress intended to reject this limitation on union activities
through its broad definition of a labor dispute in section 13 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.35
The exemption established in Hutcheson, however, was not
available to the employers in the Brown case. The Hutcheson
decision concerned the Sherman Act's "application to trade union
activities and the efforts to secure legislative relief from its con-
sequences" for unions."6 Justice Frankfurter's opinion addressed
only union conduct and interpreted Congress's purpose in enact-
ing Norris-LaGuardia as being "to protect the rights of labor in
the same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act."37 In Justice Frankfurter's view, the "Norris-
LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton
Act by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as
redefined by the later Act."
31
Unable to use the Hutcheson exemption to protect its unilater-
al imposition of the developmental squad wage, the NFL had to
rely primarily 9 on the second exemption from the antitrust
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
34. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37,
49-55 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-77 (1921)
(holding that section 20 does not insulate a union's "secondary boycott" from anti-
trust challenge).
35. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 230-36.
36. Id. at 229.
37. Id. at 236 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 669, at 3 (1932)).
38. Id.
39. The NFL also argued, based on language in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 512 (1940), and in section 6 of the Clayton Act, that the Sherman Act
does not reach any limitations on competition in a labor market that do not also
directly affect competition in a product market. Brief for Respondents at 18-26,
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) (No. 95-388). Although some low-
er court decisions supported this argument, see, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Tex-
tile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482, 488-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
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laws that the Court had recognized in order to accommodate
federal labor laws. The Court first applied this second, "nonstat-
utory"4 exemption in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980), neither Apex Hosiery nor section 6 ulti-
mately provided a strong defense for the League.
In Apex, the Supreme Court held that section 1 of the Sherman Act did not
reach a union's attempt to coerce a closed shop through a violent sitdown strike,
seizure of the employer's property, and prevention of the interstate shipment of fin-
ished goods. See Apex, 310 U.S. at 513. Justice Stone's opinion for the Court con-
tained assertions that the Sherman Act does not apply unless there is "some form of
restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services." Id. at
495. Justice Stone's analysis, however, including this language, was directed at dis-
tinguishing employees' efforts to control labor markets directly from business firms'
attempts to control product markets, in order to achieve the same insulation of con-
certed union action that Justice Frankfurter achieved through his use of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in Hutcheson. See id. at 501-04. Nowhere in the Apex decision did
Justice Stone consider the possibility that Apex might be relevant to business firms
conspiring to restrain labor markets. Revealingly, the Apex opinion does not even
cite the Court's earlier decision in Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359
(1926), holding that the Sherman Act encompassed an agreement between
shipowners and operators not to compete in the hiring of seamen. See id. at 362-65.
After Apex, the Court held in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957), that Radovich stated a viable antitrust claim by alleging that the NFL clubs
had agreed to blacklist him for playing in a rival league. See id at 449, 453-54.
Although Radovich's allegations included claims that the blacklisting was part of a
conspiracy against the rival league, the Court did not suggest that the success of his
suit required proof of product market restraints. See id. at 448-49, 453-54.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act provided an even weaker defense. The NFL argued
that this section, which states that "[tihe labor of a human being is not a commodi-
ty or article of commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1994), was intended to insulate from anti-
trust challenge all restraints that only limit labor market competition. See Brief for
Respondents, supra, at 21-22. This argument, however, was rejected, at least implic-
itly, by the Supreme Court in numerous cases since the passage of the Clayton Act
in 1914, including early decisions, such as Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443, 469 (1921), and Anderson, and later decisions, such as Hutcheson and Lo-
cal Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Ameri-
ca v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965), both of which could have been
more easily decided under the NFL's interpretation of section 6. See infra notes 41-
47 and accompanying text. The NFL's interpretation of this open-ended statement in
section 6 is not supported by the section's legislative history. See James M. Altman,
Antitrust: A New Tool for Organized Labor?, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 127, 147-50 (1982);
Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers'
Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 617,
635-49.
Not surprisingly, the Court's decision in Brown, which does not even acknowl-
edge either the Apex or section 6 arguments, again placed limits on its holding that
are inconsistent with the insulation of all labor market restraints from antitrust
challenge. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
40. The "nonstatutory" exemption description was drawn by Justice Powell in his
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Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jewel Tea
Co.4 to avert an antitrust challenge to a union-imposed provi-
sion in a collective-bargaining agreement that required that
meat marketing occur only between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.42
The Hutcheson exemption did not protect this provision because
it involved an agreement, or collaboration, of the union with a
nonlabor group, the signatory employer.43 Justice White, in a
plurality opinion for the Court, held that the agreement none-
theless was exempt from the provisions of the Sherman Act be-
cause, under the facts found by the trial court, the union im-
posed the marketing hours in order to protect its members from
either longer working hours or a loss of work, rather than to
restrain competition from self-service stores." Justice White
thereby distinguished the collective bargaining agreement provi-
sion that he and a majority of the Court struck down in the com-
panion case of United Mine Workers v. Pennington.45  In
Pennington, the Court determined that the union's pledge to
large coal mine operators that it would impose an unaffordable
high wage level on smaller operators was designed to harm com-
petition by restraining the product market for coal rather than
simply to affect the labor market for the union's miners.46
majority opinion in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), to distinguish Hutcheson's "statutory" exemption. See
id. at 622.
41. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
42. See id. at 695.
43. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
44. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-94. Justice Goldberg also wrote a plurality
concurring opinion for three Justices. See id. at 697 (Goldberg, J., concurring). He
would have held the marketing hour restraints to be exempt because they were in-
cluded in a collective bargaining agreement and treated what he judged to be a
mandatory topic of bargaining that affected employees directly. See id. at 697, 735
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
45. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
46. See id. at 667. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea also con-
tained a dissent from the majority opinion (though not the reversal) in Pennington.
See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Citing both section 6 of
the Clayton Act and Apex, see supra note 39, Justice Goldberg argued that the re-
straints in Pennington, like those in Jewel Tea, should be exempt from antitrust
challenge because they were contained in a collective bargaining agreement and con-
cerned what he viewed as a mandatory topic of bargaining. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S.
at 697 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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Because the Jewel Tea nonstatutory exemption is based on
the general policies favoring collective bargaining expressed in
the federal labor laws, including the National Labor Relations
Act,47 rather than on particular, limited statutory provisions, it
offered more promise as a defense for the NFL in Brown than
did the Hutcheson statutory exemption. Nonetheless, as articu-
lated by the Supreme Court, the nonstatutory exemption did not
comfortably fit the NFL's action in Brown for two reasons, only
one of which had been addressed by lower court decisions at the
time that the district court considered the League's exemption
defense.
First, the Supreme Court had recognized the nonstatutory
exemption as protection only for union-initiated labor market
restraints, not for any employer-initiated restraints. As Justice
Powell explained in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100:
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong
labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate
competition over wages and working conditions. Union suc-
cess in organizing workers and standardizing wages ultimate-
ly will affect price competition among employers, but the
goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this ef-
fect on business competition were held a violation of the anti-
trust laws. The Court therefore has acknowledged that labor
policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business compe-
tition based on differences in wages and working condi-
tions.48
Under this view, the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption,
like that of the statutory exemption, is to accommodate the anti-
trust laws to a central purpose of the labor laws, allowing work-
ers to organize and freely take concerted action in attempts to
raise wages and other terms of employment to levels higher
than could be achieved by individual, noncollective bargaining in
a free labor market. The Court in Hutcheson read the Norris-
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-692 (1994).
48. 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). Justice Powell cited Pennington and Jewel Tea for
support. See id-
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LaGuardia and Clayton Acts to protect concerted employee ac-
tion to this end.49 Jewel Tea's nonstatutory exemption recog-
nized that such concerted action ultimately cannot be meaning-
ful if collective agreements securing higher wages and other
benefits are themselves subject to antitrust attack."
The Court's view of the purpose of the labor laws explains its
focus in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell on whether the
purpose of the challenged agreements in those cases was to as-
sist certain employers in gaining greater control over their prod-
uct markets, rather than serving only the employees' interests in
controlling the labor market.5 Thus, the Jewel Tea decision
turned on the finding that the union had pressed the marketing
hours restraint in order to protect the working hours of butch-
ers, rather than to protect the sales of traditional meat markets
from supermarket competition,52 while the Pennington decision
stressed allegations that the union conspired with large coal op-
erators to eliminate smaller competitors from the coal indus-
try.5
3
Connell held nonexempt a contractor's agreement with a un-
ion not to subcontract work to subcontractors not organized by
that union.' The Court stressed that the contractor did not
have a collective bargaining relationship with the union.55 The
challenged restraint clearly was union initiated, but Justice
Powell found it to be subject to an antitrust challenge because it
directly eliminated nonunion competitors from favored unionized
employers' product markets, "even if their competitive advantag-
es were not derived from substandard wages and working condi-
49. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 230-36 (1941).
50. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
51. The fact that any greater product market control could ultimately indirectly
benefit the signatory unions through an increase in product market returns to be
shared with union-represented workers would not warrant exemption. See United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 667 (1965) (striking down an agreement
designed to increase the employer's market share despite the fact that union mem-
bers would benefit indirectly).
52. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of
N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688-94 (1965).
53. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 667.
54. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 635.
55. See id.
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tions but rather from more efficient operating methods."56
This limitation on the use of the nonstatutory exemption did
not, however, pose an insurmountable hurdle for the NFL when
the district court considered its exemption defense in Brown.
Prior antitrust challenges to labor market restraints in the
sports industry had produced lower court decisions that expand-
ed the reach of the nonstatutory exemption from union-initiated
labor market restraints to at least some employer-initiated labor
market restraints.5 7 The Eighth Circuit had rendered the most
important opinion on point in Mackey v. National Football
League.5"
Mackey involved an antitrust challenge to the NFL's "Rozelle
Rule."59 This rule provided that whenever a player whose em-
ployment contract with one club had expired, signed a contract
to play for a different club, the NFL commissioner could award
the former club one or more players from the roster of the ac-
quiring club as the commissioner deemed "fair and equitable,"
unless the two clubs reached an alternative and mutually satis-
factory arrangement." The plaintiff players in Mackey made a
strong case that this rule discouraged clubs from hiring players
formerly under contract with other clubs and thereby restrained
labor mobility and reduced player salaries.6 Although a 1968
collective bargaining agreement with the players' union had
incorporated the Rozelle Rule, the League had unilaterally first
promulgated it in 1963."
The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lay, held that the
rule was subject to antitrust challenge," but not simply because
56. Id. at 623; see also Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945) (holding that a labor union may have violated the
antitrust laws when it entered into agreements to "aid and abet" electrical manufac-
turers and contractors to monopolize their business markets in a metropolitan area).
57. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir.
1989).
58. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 610-11.
61. See id. at 620-21.
62. Cf. id. at 610-11 (discussing the history of the Rozelle Rule).
63. See id. at 621-23.
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cause it was framed by the NFL to enhance the teams' control of
the labor market for players. The court instead found that "[be-
cause] the basis of the nonstatutory exemption is the national
policy favoring collective bargaining, and since the exemption
extends to agreements,... under appropriate circumstances,...
a non-labor group may avail itself of the labor exemption."'
According to the court, those appropriate circumstances are
present when the challenged restraint: first, "primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship;"' sec-
ond, concerns a subject over which labor law requires each party
to bargain;66 and third, "is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining." 7 The court concluded that the Rozelle Rule quali-
fied for exemption under the first two standards, but nonethe-
less could be challenged by the players because it failed to meet
the third.68 In the court's view, the rule was not the product of
arm's-length bargaining because the League initially imposed it
unilaterally and then forced it into a collective agreement with-
out modification and, according to a finding of the trial court,
without the relatively weak union receiving any quid pro quo.69
A number of commentators criticized the Mackey decision,
especially for using the third, quid pro quo standard to depart
from established labor law principles disfavoring governmental
evaluations of the substantive outcome of collective bargain-
ing."0 The decision, however, influenced other courts treating
antitrust challenges to labor market restraints on professional
athletes,7 and no court or commentator questioned Mackey's
64. Id. at 612.
65. Id. at 614.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 615-16.
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39, at 655-56; Roberts, supra note 11, at 394;
John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons From the Sports
Industry, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 109, 126-27.
71. See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.
1979) (holding the National Hockey League's collectively bargained free agency com-
pensation system exempt from antitrust challenge under the Mackey test); Reynolds
v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 288-89 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding the re-
vised collectively bargained NFL free agency system to be exempt under the Mackey
test); McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992);
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assumption that employers should be able to assert the nonstat-
utory exemption to insulate at least some restraints embodied in
collective bargaining agreements. In light of Mackey and its
progeny, therefore, the district court in Brown was not prevent-
ed from accepting the NFL's nonstatutory labor exemption de-
fense by the fact that the League, rather than the union, had
proposed the flat wage for developmental squad players.
Nevertheless, neither Mackey nor any other lower court deci-
sion issued prior to the district court's rejection of the NFL's
nonstatutory labor exemption defense offered the NFL any direct
support for overcoming a second argument available to the play-
ers to distinguish all of the Supreme Court precedents on the
nonstatutory exemption. The Jewel Tea, Pennington, and
Connell decisions all considered whether the exemption was
available for agreements between a union and employers;"2
none of those cases addressed restraints like those at issue in
Brown that not only were proposed by employers but also were
unilaterally imposed by them without union acceptance in a
collective agreement. Moreover, the players could ground the
distinction between bilateral agreements and unilateral action
by employers in the theory underlying the nonstatutory exemp-
tion, as expressed in Connell and implied in Jewel Tea:"' A
nonstatutory exemption protecting the fruits of concerted union
action must supplement the statutory exemption protecting
union action directed toward controlling the labor market for
employees in order for the labor laws effectively to protect union
efforts to raise wages above those that employees could achieve
in individual negotiations.
Rather than circumventing this distinction, the Mackey deci-
Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987);
Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986); see
also Burt v. Blue Shield, 591 F. Supp. 755, 762 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (asserting that
the Mackey test can apply outside of the sports industry).
72. See supra notes 42, 46, 48 and accompanying text. As stated by the Court in
Connell, "a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in
business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limit-
ed nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (emphasis added).
73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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sion underscored it. The Mackey majority did not fully explain
how it had derived its three standards, but, in a key footnote, it
quoted a passage from Justice White's plurality opinion in Jewel
Tea, which focused on whether the challenged provision was a
product of "bona fide, arm's length bargaining" in pursuit of the
union's own goals.74 The Mackey opinion thus framed the third
standard to allow employers to assert the nonstatutory exemp-
tion for their own labor market restraints only when they could
establish that such restraints served the national labor policy
favoring employee labor market cartelization, rather than em-
ployer cartelization. This required a demonstration that the un-
ion had achieved some enhancement of benefits for represented
employees by trading its acceptance of the employers' restraints
for the employers' grant of the benefits. Therefore, the key factu-
al issue in Mackey was whether the union actually did achieve
some quid pro quo, such as "increased pension benefits" for the
players that it represented.75
The NFL could not rely on Mackey in its arguments to the
district court in Brown because the League had never obtained
the NFLPA's agreement to the flat wage.76 At the time of the
district court decision, moreover, no other lower court had for-
mulated an alternative theory to justify exempting from anti-
trust challenge labor market restraints that had not been ac-
cepted by a union. The Eighth Circuit had held in Powell v. Na-
tional Football League77 that the nonstatutory exemption of-
fered protection to the NFL's continued implementation of labor
market restrictions incorporated in two collective agreements
with the NFLPA after those agreements expired and even after
the parties reached a bargaining impasse on continued imple-
mentation during negotiations for a new agreement. The Eighth
Circuit in Powell, however, professing adherence to Mackey,
noted that the parties did not dispute that the prior bargaining
agreements met the Mackey standards, and seemed to limit its
74. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 n.15 (quoting Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90
(1965)).
75. See id. at 616 & n.17.
76. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996).
77. 930 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1989).
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holding to the protection of employer-initiated restraints that, at
least at one time, had received union acceptance. 8 Further-
more, although the Powell decision did not explain how Mackey's
justification for exempting employer-initiated restraints could
extend beyond the expiration of an agreement that guaranteed
represented employees some quid pro quo, it also did not ad-
vance any other coherent and compelling rationale for exempting
employer-initiated restraints not accepted by the union.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, did
present such a coherent and compelling rationale just two
months before the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's rejection of
the NFL's exemption defense in Brown. In National Basketball
Ass'n v. Williams,9 the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Ralph K. Winter, held exempt from antitrust challenge the
NBA's continued imposition of certain labor market restraints,
including a revenue sharing, salary cap system and the assign-
ment of desirable rookies through a "college draft," after the ex-
piration of a collective bargaining agreement in which the union
had consented to the restraints." Although the facts of Wil-
liams resembled those of Powell rather than those of Brown,
inasmuch as the league only desired to continue restraints to
which the union had previously agreed,8 ' Judge Winter did not
base the opinion on the Powell court's effort to expand Mackey.
Indeed, the opinion was not even an attempt to expand the prin-
ciples pronounced in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell, none
of which Judge Winter even cited. Instead, Judge Winter relied
on the Court's and Congress's affirmation of the importance of
the system of multiemployer bargaining to American labor rela-
tions. Judge Winter concluded that failing to protect from an-
titrust challenge a sports league's authority to implement a
labor market restraint after a bargaining impasse over that
restraint would threaten the system of multiemployer bargaining.'
78. See id. at 1298-99, 1303.
79. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
80. See id. at 690-93.
81. See id. at 685-86.
82. See id. at 689.
83. See id. at 687-93. Judge Winter's approach to the Williams case reflected
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Judge Winter stressed that collective bargaining in the sports
industry is an example of a common practice, involving millions
of American employees and thousands of employers, and "proba-
bly as old as unionism itself."' Multiemployer collective bar-
gaining is a process by which employers who may compete in
both product and labor markets join together to bargain with a
views he had first advanced in a law review article written during the Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), litigation. See Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K Winter, Jr.,
Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: *Of Superstars in Peonage,
81 YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
It is commonplace for employers to bargain as a group rather than singly
and the Supreme Court has explicitly declared multi-employer bargaining
to be authorized by the National Labor Relations Act.... Flood's argu-
ments, if accepted, would have absurd practical effects. For example,
when the steel firms make a joint wage offer to the United Steelworkers,
an employee dissatisfied with the offer might, if the claims pressed in
Flood are right, sue the companies for engaging in a price fix.
Id.
Judge Winter's decision in Williams was also presaged by his opinion in Wood
v. National Basketball Association, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987), rejecting a
rookie draftee's antitrust challenge to the NBA's salary cap. Because the players'
union had consented to the challenged salary cap in a collective bargaining agree-
ment in effect at the time of the Wood litigation, see id. at 957, Judge Winter did
not have to stress the importance of protecting the processes of multieiployer bar-
gaining in that case. He also did not cite Mackey or rest on the NBA players' union
having obtained something of adequate value in return for their agreement to the
restraints.
In Caldwell v. American Basketball Association, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995), sub-
sequent to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Brown, Judge Winter relied on his analysis
in Williams to affirm a grant of summary judgment dismissing an ex-basketball
player's antitrust claim that the clubs of the old American Basketball Association
(ABA) had conspired to prevent him from playing during the period when the ABA
was merging with the NBA because of his involvement with the ABA players' union.
See id. at 529-31. Judge Winter asserted that under Williams it was irrelevant that
the union had not agreed to the alleged blacklisting, as long as there was an extant
multiemployer collective bargaining relationship that could have addressed the terms
of the player's employment. See id. at 529-30. As suggested at the end of Judge
Winter's Caldwell opinion, however, labor law could have displaced antitrust law in
this case, even if there had been no collective bargaining relationship, because
Caldwell's claims of blacklisting did not allege joint employer efforts to suppress
competition in the players' labor market. See id. at 530. Rather, the alleged discrim-
ination against union activities would have supported unfair labor practice charges
under the National Labor Relations Act. See id.
For another forceful expression of what is essentially the Winter thesis, see
Douglas L. Leslie, Brown v. Pro Football, 82 VA. L. REV. 629 (1996).
84. Williams, 45 F.3d at 688.
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common union or unions.' Relying on the Court's exposition in
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 6 Winter ex-
plained that multiemployer bargaining benefits both employers
and employees in many industries outside of sports.8 7 Such bar-
gaining benefits employers by enabling them "to form a common
front" against a union that otherwise could strike against one
employer at a time in order to achieve its demands, and by en-
suring that particular employers will not face competitive disad-
vantage by agreeing to more generous terms of employment
than those that the union might negotiate with other employ-
ers.' Multiemployer bargaining benefits employees by enabling
their unions to assure employers that their granting of generous
terms will not place them at a competitive disadvantage and by
making available group benefit programs, such as pension
entitlements, that are funded more securely and can be carried
between employers.89 Finally, multiemployer bargaining bene-
fits both employers and employees by eliminating the costs of
duplicative negotiations."0
Judge Winter emphasized that numerous opinions of the Su-
preme Court, including Bonanno Linen and NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 449 ("Buffalo Linen"), ' had approved
the practice of multiemployer bargaining. In Buffalo Linen, the
85. See id.
86. 454 U.S. 404, 409-10 & n.3 (1982).
87. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 688-89.
88. See id. at 688.
89. Cf id. at 688-89 (describing the benefits of multiemployer bargaining to em-
ployers).
90. See id The Bonanno Linen discussion of the benefits of multiemployer bar-
gaining helps explain why both employers and unions would voluntarily choose a
form of bargaining that could not simultaneously increase the bargaining leverage of
each side. For another thoughtful explanation, treating the Bonanno Linen factors as
well as the need for union leadership to satisfy their members' demand for equitable
treatment between employers, see Jan Vetter, Commentary on "Multiemployer Bar-
gaining Rules: Searching for the Right Questions, 75 VA. L. REV. 285 (1989). See
also Douglas L. Leslie, Multiemployer Bargaining Rules, 75 VA. L. REv. 241, 260-69
(1989) (providing an economic analysis of multiemployer bargaining and its attendant
legal rules); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Commentary on "Multiemployer Bargaining
Rules. • The Limitations of a Strictly Economic Analysis, 75 VA. L. REV. 279, 282-83
(1989) (emphasizing "the noneconomic aspects of a labor union's nature" and supple-
menting economic analysis of multiemployer bargaining).
91. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
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Court held that the nonstruck members of a multiemployer bar-
gaining unit did not violate the labor laws by temporarily lock-
ing out their employees as a defense to a union's strike against
one of their members.92 The Court reasoned that the employers'
objective to preserve the multiemployer unit was legitimate un-
der federal labor law because Congress had recognized the im-
portance of such bargaining to American industrial relations.93
Making the reasonable assumption that the holding in Buffalo
Linen meant that a defensive lockout by a multiemployer associ-
ation not only can survive the labor laws, but also cannot be
challenged under the antitrust laws, Judge Winter argued that
Buffalo Linen required rejection of the plaintiffs antitrust
claims in Williams because the challenged practice, the mainte-
nance of restrictive terms after the termination of a collective
agreement on such terms, could not be distinguished from the
use of economic coercion, such as a lockout, to impose those
terms.94 For Judge Winter, both practices exemplified bargain-
ing tactics that would be legal for single employers under the
labor laws and therefore must be legal for multiemployer associ-
ations given the Court's and Congress's endorsement of
multiemployer bargaining. 9
As explained above, in Williams the NBA maintained restric-
tive terms to which the players' union consented in prior collec-
tive agreements; the NBA did not impose new terms unilateral-
ly, as the NFL did in Brown.9" Judge Winter's reasoning and
his stated holding, however, clearly cover the Brown scenario as
well. As Judge Winter noted, labor law permits a single employ-
er to impose unilaterally terms of employment over which it has
bargained to impasse.97 If multiemployer associations are to be
insulated from antitrust attack for engaging in a bargaining tac-
tic that would be legal under the labor laws for a single em-
92. See id. at 93-97.
93. The Court cited the rejection of proposals to outlaw multiemployer bargaining
during the debates on the TaftHartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994). See Buffalo
Linen, 353 U.S. at 94-95.
94. See Williams, 45 F.3d at 692.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 686, 687.
97. See id. at 691.
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ployer, then the NFL's unilateral imposition of the flat wage for
developmental squad players after bargaining to impasse also
must be exempt from antitrust challenge. Indeed, Judge Winter
concluded his analysis by rejecting the Williams plaintiffs' theo-
ry because it would prevent a group of printers from bargaining
to impasse and implementing only a five percent wage increase,
rather than the ten percent raise demanded by the union."
Such constraints on employers, asserted Judge Winter, cannot
result in "collective bargaining as intended by Congress."99
Not surprisingly the Williams decision provided a strong basis
of support for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals'
reversal of the district court's rejection of the NFL's exemption
defense in Brown.' Relying heavily on Williams, Judge Harry
Edwards held that the antitrust laws allowed the NFL to take
the same unilateral action after impasse that labor law doctrine
makes clear is allowable for a single employer.'' Judge Ed-
wards, like Judge Winter, argued that it was "wholly untenable"
that the presence of a multiemployer bargaining unit should
affect the tactics available to the parties.0 The analysis in
Brown only supplemented that in Williams by connecting the
antitrust exemption for multiemployer bargaining with the non-
statutory labor exemption delineated in the earlier Supreme
Court decisions.0 3 Judge Edwards read these cases broadly to
shield not only collective bargaining agreements, but also any
part of a collective bargaining process that is legal under federal
labor law.' Restraints, therefore, that are imposed through
such a process, and that primarily affect only a labor market
subject to such a process, cannot be condemned under the anti-
trust laws.' 5
98. See id. at 693.
99. Id.
100. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'g 821 F.
Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1993).
101. See id. at 1056-57.
102. See id. at 1055.
103. See id. at 1056.
104. See id. at 1049-51.
105. See id. at 1046.
1997] 1683
1684 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1663
III.
In order for the players' lawyers in Brown to fare better before
the Supreme Court, they had to provide a compelling answer to
the argument that their antitrust claims threatened the estab-
lished process of multiemployer bargaining in a range of indus-
tries regulated by federal labor laws. This need became even
more acute when amici briefs from employer associations repre-
senting industries heavily engaged in multiemployer bargaining,
such as trucking, construction, shipping, hospital care, coal min-
ing, railroad, and entertainment, inundated the Supreme
Court.' Each of these briefs emphasized that even if
multiemployer bargaining is mandatory in the sports industry,
in which clubs belong to a joint venture in marketing team com-
petitions,0 7 and therefore must establish at least some com-
mon terms of employment, in other industries it rests on the
consent of each employer and union involved.' ° The amicus
106. See Brief of the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers as Amicus
Curiae, Brown (No. 95-388) [hereinafter Brief of the Alliance]; Brief for American
Trucking Associations as Amicus Curiae, id.; Brief Amicus Curiae for the Associated
General Contractors of America, Inc., id.; Brief of Bituminous Coal Operators' Associ-
ation, Inc. and Trucking Management, Inc. as Amici Curiae, id.; Brief on the Merits
for Carriers Container Council, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, id.; Brief of the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America and the National Association of Manu-
facturers as Amici Curiae, id.; Brief of League of Voluntary Hospitals and Homes of
New York et al. as Amici Curiae, id.; Brief of the National Electrical Contractors
Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, id.; Brief of the National Railway Labor Confer-
ence as Amicus Curiae, id.
107. See North Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (enforc-
ing a Board order requiring teams in a professional soccer league to bargain as
"joint employers" in a league-wide bargaining unit).
108. The National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or "the Labor Board") condition-
ing of multiemployer bargaining on the consent of each employer and of the union
representative derives from the fact that the formation of multiemployer units is not
explicitly authorized by the National Labor Relations Act. Section 9(b) refers only to
units defined by employer, craft, plant, or subdivision thereof. See National Labor
Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994). It is, thus, an unfair labor practice for
either the union or an employer to attempt to coerce the other side into commencing
multiemployer bargaining. See United Mine Workers, Local No. 1854, 238 N.L.R.B.
1583, 1586-87 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 323
(1981).
Nevertheless, the Labor Board, with judicial assent, asserted the authority to
recognize multiemployer units voluntarily agreed to by all participants soon after
passage of the Act. See Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1040-41 (1938), aftfd,
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briefs issued the quite credible warning that employers would
have to reevaluate their participation in multiemployer bargain-
ing if the Supreme Court held that jointly engaging in a bar-
gaining tactic that is legal under the labor laws but not consent-
ed to by a union could subject them to antitrust litigation."9 If
employers withdrew from multiemployer bargaining units, then
employees and employers of multiemployer bargaining would
lose the common benefits recognized in Bonanno Linen.
Logic and precedent offered the players' lawyers in Brown two
approaches to allay concerns about the general impact on
multiemployer bargaining of allowing the NFL to be subjected to
antitrust scrutiny. The players' lawyers could have attempted to
distinguish the purpose and effect of joint actions by employers
engaged in collective bargaining in the sports industry from
those of joint actions in other industries. Alternatively, the
players' lawyers could have attempted to distinguish the particu-
lar joint action challenged in Brown, the unilateral imposition of
terms after impasse, from other joint actions, such as a joint
lockout, that have been specifically endorsed for multiemployer
bargaining under federal labor law."' The first distinction had
to rest on some important difference between collective bargain-
ing in the sports industry and multiemployer bargaining in oth-
er industries. That distinction would enable the Court to allow
players to mount antitrust challenges to employer restraints in
the sports industry without disturbing collective bargaining in
other industries."' The second distinction had to explain why
allowing employees in any industry to challenge joint employer
308 U.S. 401 (1940). Moreover, since 1958 the Labor Board has held that, when a
union and employers agree to negotiate in a multiemployer unit, neither side can
withdraw from the unit after negotiations on a collective agreement have begun, ab-
sent "unusual circumstances" or the consent of the other side. See, e.g., Retail
Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958). In 1973, the Labor Board held that a
bargaining impasse is not an unusual circumstance justifying an employer's with-
drawal from a unit without union consent. See Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B.
22, 23-24 (1973) (denying retroactive enforcement of new doctrine because employer
could not anticipate change in law).
109. See, e.g., Brief of the Alliance at 1, Brown (No. 95-388) (declaring that adop-
tion of the players' position "would threaten the continuation of multi-employer bar-
gaining" in the entertainment industry and other industries).
110. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how this distinction should work.
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imposition of unilateral terms after impasse would not threaten
multiemployer bargaining.
The players' lawyers chose to make the second distinction.
Supported by Judge Patricia Wald's dissent from the Court of
Appeals decision in Brown,"' they argued that the unilateral im-
plementation of terms after impasse should be treated not as an
economic weapon or tactic of bargaining, like strikes or lockouts,
but rather as a "one-sided substitute for a bargaining
agreement.""' That is, unilateral imposition is not a "means"
by which to advance bargaining, but rather is "an end in itself,
principally designed to serve the employers' business interests
rather than to influence the bargaining process."" 4 In the view
of the players' lawyers, and Judge Wald, terms of employment
unilaterally imposed after impasse in collective bargaining
should be as subject to state and federal background laws as are
employment terms imposed unilaterally outside of collective bar-
gaining."5 In this view, exposure of such terms to antiturst
challenge does not disrupt the regulation of the collective bar-
gaining process that is the province of federal labor law."6
The players' lawyers also distinguished unilateral imposition
of terms from bargaining tactics in order to answer the claims of
Judge Winter, and of the amici from other industries, that allow-
ance of the players' antitrust claims would threaten
multiemployer bargaining by denying employers an important
bargaining strategy."7 The players' brief stressed that anti-
trust scrutiny of unilaterally imposed employment restraints
would not deny employer associations the collective exercise of a
"panoply of economic weapons,""' including: lockouts;".. the
112. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1058 (1995), affd, 116 S. Ct.
2116 (1996).
113. Brief for Petitioners at 36, Brown (No. 95-388).
114. Id. at 36; see also Brown, 50 F.3d at 1066-69 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the employers' unilateral imposition of the fixed salary "had nothing to do with
tactical [bargaining] advantages," but everything to do with self-interest).
115. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1066-69; Brief for Petitioners at 36, Brown (No. 95-
388).
116. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1069 (Wald, J., dissenting).
117. See Brief for Petitioners at 37-41, Brown (No. 95-388).
118. Id. at 40.
119. See id. (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int'l Bhd. of
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hiring of temporary replacement workers during lockouts;'
and the maintenance of a strike insurance fund to reduce the
impact of a whipsaw strike directed at one of their members. 2'
The brief also asserted that each individual employer could
independently impose employment terms, such as the flat salary
for developmental squad players at issue in Brown, without
being subject to antitrust challenge, as long as the association of
employers, like the NFL, did not enforce the terms.'22 The brief
then claimed that "these options provide sufficient flexibility for
employer associations to bargain jointly for the terms they
want."m3
The players' brief, however, did not adequately explain how
the Court could allow the NFL's unilateral imposition of the flat
salary to be subject to antitrust attack without also exposing
Judge Winter's printers and multiemployer associations in other
industries" to potential antitrust challenges for jointly impos-
ing an employment term other than that for which a union had
bargained to impasse. The players' proposed rule would operate
identically in the printing or trucking industry; employer associ-
ations in each industry would be insulated from antitrust attack
for their joint use of economic weapons to coerce the union's
agreement to economic restraints, but they would not be insulat-
Teamsters ("Buffalo Linen"), 353 U.S. 87, 97 (1957)).
120. See id. (citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 285 (1965)).
121. See id. at 40 (citing Brown, 380 U.S. at 285; Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 97);
cf. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319 F.2d 366, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1963) (allowing
competitive railroads to pool funds to protect against a strike directed at one of
their number).
122. See Brief for Petitioners at 41, Brown (No. 95-388).
123. Id. Judge Wald made the same argument. She also would include
multiemployer 'bargaining tactics,' such as joint lockouts and strike insurance pacts,
within the scope of the nonstatutory exemption, see Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50
F.3d 1041, 1067 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting), and concluded that such
options were adequate to preserve "the 'delicate balance' of the collective bargaining
process," without also exempting postimpasse unilateral imposition of terms, id. at
1070 (Wald, J., dissenting). Unlike the Brown players' lawyers, moreover, Judge
Wald suggested that an employers' association's maintenance of the status quo in
employment terms after impasse, as in Williams, should also be exempt from anti-
trust challenge. See id. at 1070 & n.9 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald did not
clarify how exempting status quo terms was consistent with her distinction between
"terms" and "tactics."
124. See supra text accompanying note 98; infra note 125.
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ed if they imposed such restraints unilaterally."2
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown makes clear that the
players' lawyers chose the wrong distinction. The players' law-
yers failed to distinguish the purpose and effect of traditional
multiemployer bargaining from that conducted in the sports in-
dustry. Consequently, the Court's rejection in Brown of the pro-
posed distinction of unilateral imposition of terms from other
joint employer actions during collective bargaining was fully pre-
dictable.
Justice Breyer's opinion for the eight-Justice majority ex-
pressed concern that subjecting the "familiar" multiemployer
bargaining practice of jointly implementing proposed terms after
impasse to antitrust law would "place in jeopardy some of the
potentially beneficial labor-related effects that multiemployer
bargaining can achieve."126 Citing Buffalo Linen, Bonanno Lin-
en, a congressional committee report, and a statistical appendix
to his own opinion showing that more than forty percent of ma-
jor collective bargaining agreements in the United States are the
products of multiemployer bargaining, Justice Breyer described
multiemployer bargaining as "a well-established, important, per-
vasive method of collective bargaining, offering advantages to
both management and labor... [that] compriseU an important
part of the Nation's industrial relations system."'27 Perhaps in-
fluenced by the threats of amici employer associations to review
125. The players' brief did assert that "[ijn the more traditional bargaining context,
where labor organizations seek standardized industry-wide compensation terms,"
Brief for Petitioners at 39, Brown (No. 95-388), rather than the preservation of indi-
vidual negotiations that players' unions seek in the sports industry, there have been
no significant antitrust challenges because employees in those other industries "ac-
cept the legitimacy of common employment terms for all employees." Id. The absence
of such challenges, however, may indicate that unions, as well as employers, en-
gaged in traditional multiemployer bargaining assumed that the antitrust laws were
not applicable. Significantly, the brief did not explain why antitrust challenges could
not be expected in other industries if the Court were to adopt the players' suggested
rule. Workers in a printing industry union who accept the legitimacy of common
employment terms might still wish to use the antitrust laws to challenge a printers'
association's unilateral imposition of a pay increase below that for which the union
bargained to impasse. Based on the position taken in the players' brief in Brown,
the workers could claim that the printers would have to obtain the union's consent
before the printers could jointly impose terms.
126. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2122.
127. Id.
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their participation in multiemployer bargaining," as well as
the absence of briefs from unions outside the sports and enter-
tainment industries or from the NLRB that might have included
countervailing assurances, 9 Justice Breyer expressed unwill-
ingness to allow antitrust challenges to multiemployer collective
bargaining practices accepted under the federal labor laws.3 '
The players' arguments failed to persuade the eight-Justice
majority that multiemployer associations would retain adequate
strategic options at impasse in bargaining if the joint imposition
of terms were subject to antitrust attack. The majority opinion
rejected the players' contention that individual employers in a
multiemployer bargaining association would be free to impose
terms independently after impasse without the threat of anti-
trust attack.'3 ' The opinion noted that labor law restricts
postimpasse imposition to terms "reasonably comprehended"
within the employers' last offer,"' and that a joint action by all
the employers to "impose terms similar to their last joint of-
fer... invite[s] an antitrust action premised upon identical be-
128. See supra note 109.
129. The NLRB did not join the brief for the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission as amici curiae supporting the petitioners. A footnote at the end of this
brief, raising more questions than it answered, stated that "[tihe National Labor Re-
lations Board concurs that the court of appeals' expansive formulation of the labor
exemption is wrong as a matter of law, and may do serious harm to the nation's
antitrust and labor policies if not reversed." Brief for the United States and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission as Amici Curiae at 27 n.10, Brown (No. 95-388). In any
event, the government's brief did not address the potential impact of allowing the
players' claims on multiemployer collective bargaining in other industries.
Unions in the entertainment industry filed the only other amicus brief in sup-
port of the players from parties outside the sports industry. See Brief of the Screen
Actors Guild, Inc. et al. as Amii Curiae, Brown (No. 95-388). This brief claimed
that an exemption of the NFL's unilateral imposition of terms would free movie pro-
duction companies to cap the salaries of movie stars, see id. at 6-10; it made no at-
tempt to allay concerns about the impact of a ruling for the developmental squad
players on multiemployer collective bargaining in other industries.
130. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
131. See id.
132. The Court cited the case that first used the "reasonably comprehended" lan-
guage, Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced, 395 F.2d 622
(D.C. Cir. 1968), as well as a more recent confirmation, Storer Communications, Inc.,
294 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1090 (1989). See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121. It also cited the
Supreme Court decision from which this doctrine is drawn, NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 745 & n.12 (1962). See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
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havior (along with prior or accompanying conversations) as tend-
ing to show a common understanding or agreement. " 133 The
majority opinion did not address directly the option of employer-
imposed economic coercion, such as joint lockouts and hiring
temporary replacement workers. The opinion viewed these op-
tions as "limited" and potentially as vulnerable to antitrust chal-
lenge as the joint imposition of terms if the Brown plaintiffs pre-
vailed. IN
The last view reflects Justice Breyer's summary rejection of
the players' lawyers' attempt to press Judge Wald's distinction of
postimpasse employer agreements about bargaining "tactics"
from the postimpasse joint imposition of bargaining "terms." "'
Justice Breyer stressed prior judicial and Board acceptance of
the imposition of terms at impasse as a bargaining "tactic" de-
signed to compel a union to return to the bargaining table will-
ing to accept further compromises. ' 6 Justice Breyer further
133. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
134. See id. at 2124. The Court's description of the lockout and temporary replace-
ment options as "limited" is included in an analysis dismissing a position taken by
the Solicitor General in a brief filed for the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission. See id. The Solicitor General did not rely on the distinction between
bargaining tactics and bargaining terms stressed by the players' union and Judge
Wald. He instead argued that the blanket nonstatutory exemption should be com-
pletely lifted when an impasse in collective bargaining is reached. See Brief for the
United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae at 17, Brown (No.
95-388). Thus, the Solicitor General argued that a joint lockout and hiring of tempo-
rary replacements, as well as the joint imposition of terms, could be challenged if
implemented after impasse. See id. The Court dismissed this position as providing
limited and inadequate options for employers in multiemployer associations who
reach impasse in collective bargaining, because these options (other than the negotia-
tion of separate interim agreements), including the joint use of economic coercion,
could be subject to potential antitrust attack. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124. The
Court also emphasized that employers cannot be certain how long a particular im-
passe will last or when an antitrust court would mark its beginning, and that em-
ployers may have to deal with multiple impasses in any negotiation. See id. at 2124-
25.
135. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
136. See id. at 2125; see also Colorado-Ute Elec. Assn., Inc. v. NLRB, 939 F.2d
1392, 1404 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. International Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers, Local No. 111 v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 504 U.S. 955 (1992); Circuit-Wise,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 905, 921 (1992); Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23
(1973). The Court also cited American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
316 (1965), in which it had characterized the unilateral imposition of terms as one
of the "economic weapons" available to employers in bargaining. See Brown, 116 S.
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suggested that applying Judge Wald's distinction would require
antitrust courts to investigate the subjective motivations of em-
ployers to determine whether they intended the imposition of
terms in a particular case to terminate rather than advance bar-
gaining, and concluded that such an "amorphous" judicial inqui-
ry would be inconsistent with the regulation of collective bar-
gaining by the national labor laws. 3 '
IV.
A.
The Court's treatment of the arguments pressed by the
players' lawyers in Brown deserves little criticism. Without a
clear directive from Congress, it would have been irresponsible
for the Court to risk the destabilization of multiemployer collec-
tive bargaining by effectively denying the option of postimpasse
imposition of terms to multiemployer associations outside of the
Ct. at 2125.
137. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2125. Justice Breyer also dismissed an argument
advanced by both the players, see Brief for Petitioners at 29-30, Brown (No. 95-388),
and by Judge Wald in her dissent, see Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041,
1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting), based on prior Court decisions find-
ing not preempted by federal labor law state statutes that require employers to
grant minimum benefits to all employees, including those represented by unions. See
Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1
(1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)). The play-
ers and Judge Wald contended that these cases established that federal labor law
allows other law to regulate the substance of the employment terms implemented by
an organized employer, even though it does not allow other law to regulate the pro-
cess of collective bargaining. See id. As stated in the text, however, Justice Breyer
and the Brown majority recognized that the unilateral imposition of terms could it-
self be part of the process of bargaining. See id. at 2127. Surely a state law could
not directly prohibit multiemployer bargaining associations from unilaterally imple-
menting terms after impasse. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 155 (1976)
(holding that state law cannot upset the balance of economic power by regulating
bargaining tactics not regulated by federal labor law). Thus, it was consistent for the
Court to hold in Brown that antitrust law could not condemn the process of joint
imposition of terms, the substance of which both state and federal law could regu-
late. By contrast, had the NFL jointly imposed a wage for developmental squad
players that was below the minimum wage demanded under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), then nothing would have exempted
the league from a FLSA challenge.
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sports industry. The Court had good reason to understand that
multiemployer collective bargaining units had often utilized such
an option and that its availability was important to the attrac-
tiveness of such bargaining for many employers. 138 Further-
more, the players' distinction between the joint imposition of
terms and joint economic coercion to induce union agreement to
the same terms was not ultimately persuasive. Labor law and
labor law policy make no such distinction; both postimpasse
imposition of terms and economic coercion are part of the same
process of collective bargaining, whether through single employ-
ers or multiemployer associations. It is hard to understand why
antitrust law should accept economic coercion to compel unwill-
ing victims to accept restraints if it does not accept the direct
imposition of the restraints.
Nevertheless, the result in Brown does not present a proper
accommodation of the federal antitrust and labor laws. The ac-
commodation is inadequate because it does not account for the
distinction that the players' lawyers failed to make between the
purpose and effect of joint employer bargaining tactics in the
sports industry and that of similar joint bargaining tactics in
other industries. Interestingly, Justice Breyer's majority opinion
begins to ring hollow when he attempts to respond to the sug-
gestion of this distinction in the insightful dissent of Justice
Stevens.39
Justice Stevens began his dissent with a statement of the pre-
mises of the relevant antitrust and labor laws, followed by an
explanation of why the potential conflict between these premises
has required labor exemptions from antitrust prohibitions. 4
Antitrust law assumes that collusion among competitive econom-
ic entities may produce prices that ultimately ,harm consum-
ers.' Labor law assumes that without collusion through col-
lective action, applicants for employment may not be able to
achieve a price for their labor that is as high as society deems
fair and in society's ultimate interest.4 The labor laws there-
138. See supra note 136.
139. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126.
140. See id. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 2128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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fore "were enacted to enable collective action by union members
to achieve wage levels that are higher than would be available
in a free market."" Quoting language from the Connell deci-
sion, Justice Stevens explained the purpose of both the statutory
and nonstatutory exemptions as ensuring that employees, with-
out interference from antitrust law, can do that which the labor
laws are to facilitate: collective action to achieve
supracompetitive wages.'"
Justice Stevens then demonstrated why extension of the non-
statutory exemption to the Brown case cannot serve that pur-
pose. He briefly acknowledged, without much elaboration, that a
union's efforts to achieve higher wages through collective bar-
gaining may also be facilitated by protecting collective action
taken by employers in multiemployer units "in response to a
collective bargaining agent's demands for higher wages."'45 He
asserted, however, that the purpose of the nonstatutory exemp-
tion cannot be served by protecting collusion between employers
to "depress wages below the level that would be produced in a
free market" by denying "employees the opportunity to negotiate
their salaries individually in a competitive market."46 For Jus-
tice Stevens, the primary aspect of both the Brown case and
multiemployer bargaining in the sports industry in general that
makes them both atypical, is that "it is the employers, not the
employees, who seek to impose a noncompetitive uniform wage
on a segment of the market and to put an end to competitive
wage negotiations."' Thus, in a case like Brown the goals of
the antitrust and labor laws are not in tension; both are served
by preventing labor market restraints that would depress wages
below competitive levels.
Justice Stevens thereby provided the critical piece missing
from the players' argument to the Court, a distinction of the
joint action of the NFL clubs in Brown from the joint actions,
including the joint postimpasse imposition of terms, traditionally
taken by employers bargaining in multiemployer associations in
143. Id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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other industries. Justice Stevens provided an answer to Judge
Winter's hypothetical involving the printers who wished to im-
pose a five percent wage increase, rather than the ten percent
increase demanded by their employees' union, 48 and to the
amici employer associations who warned of the disintegration of
multiemployer bargaining in their industries." An exemption
could protect employers who were joining together to resist a
union's efforts to raise wages above competitive levels, without
also protecting employers who were joining together to deny par-
ticular union-represented employees the benefits of a competi-
tive labor market. The Court could exempt the typical
multiemployer association's implementation of some collective
term of employment at a level below the supracompetitive level
sought by a union, without also exempting a sports league's uni-
lateral implementation of restraints in contravention of a
players' union's desire to allow the players to remain free for
competitive, individual bargaining.
Justice Breyer's response to Justice Stevens's effort to distin-
guish the Brown case and the sports industry was not convinc-
ing. Breyer characterized Stevens's distinction as merely high-
lighting the fact that football players often have individual tal-
ents that enable them to negotiate their pay individually. 10
Breyer then simply asserted that the majority did not under-
stand how this "feature" of bargaining in professional football
should affect the underlying regulatory framework, and conclud-
ed that "it would be odd to fashion an antitrust exemption that
gave additional advantages to professional football players (by
virtue of their superior bargaining power)."15' Justice Breyer
did not respond to Justice Stevens's argument that the NFL
owners in Brown did more than merely resist an effort by the
players' union to raise wages above their competitive level, but
also colluded to depress the wages of the developmental squad
players below those that the players could have commanded in a
competitive market.'52 Nor did Breyer's opinion respond to
148. See supra text accompanying notes 98, 125.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08, 125.
150. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126.
151. Id. at 2126.
152. See id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens's contention that there is no conflict between the pre-
mises of labor law and those of antitrust law in such a case.'53
Justice Stevens chided the majority for misunderstanding the
relevance of his distinctions between Brown and typical
multiemployer bargaining, and for failing to probe, as the Court
did in Pennington, whether the policies of labor law support ex-
tending the labor exemption to the NFL's unilateral
imposition."M In the end, however, reading the Brown opinions
leaves the impression that Justice Breyer responded summarily
to Justice Stevens because Breyer failed to appreciate the full
force of Stevens's position.
Such a failure surely would be understandable. Justice
Stevens did not provide a description or defense of how antitrust
courts could apply the distinction he suggested between employ-
er collusion to depress a labor market below a competitive wage
and employer collusion to resist collective employee efforts to
inflate a labor market above such a wage. Instead, he provided
only a skeletal justification for the distinction, and then further
obscured and diluted it by highlighting two other unrelated as-
pects of the Brown case.'55 He also repeatedly emphasized that
the flat wage was a restraint never before imposed by the em-
ployers or agreed to by the union,' and critiqued at length
the majority's reliance on Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Jew-
el Tea and dissent in Pennington.'57 More importantly, the ar-
guments submitted to the Court, including those advanced by
the players' lawyers, did not clarify or develop Justice Stevens's
distinction.
153. See id. at 2131-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 2130-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Justice Stevens stressed the likelihood that the unilateral imposition of the
flat $1000 wage was not designed to recharge a stalled bargaining process and the
limited actual bargaining that preceded the NFL's claim of impasse. See id. at 2130
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Justice Stevens argued that "the main theme of [Justice Goldberg's] opinion
was that the antitrust laws should not be used to circumscribe bargaining over un-
ion demands." Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Stevens also
quoted heavily from a brief filed by then-attorney Goldberg in the Flood case, in
which the former'Justice distinguished unilaterally imposed employer restraints from
the collectively bargained restraints at issue in both Jewel Tea and Pennington. See
id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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We will never know whether the result in Brown was contin-
gent on the choice made by the players' lawyers not to press the
distinction suggested by Justice Stevens. Nevertheless, in light
of Brown's potential impact on collective bargaining in at least
two industries, sports and entertainment, and of the real possi-
bility that the Court will confront attempts to expand the broad
labor exemption suggested by the analysis of Brown, a more per-
suasive case employing Justice Stevens's distinction is worth ex-
ploring.
B.
This case should begin by acknowledging, as did Justice
Stevens, that the judicially created nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion requires a second component that accommodates the facili-
tation of multiemployer bargaining.158 This second component
should be independent of and in addition to that component rec-
ognized in Jewel Tea and developed in Mackey, that the exemp-
tion protects labor market restrictions as long as a collective
bargaining agent has voluntarily consented to those restric-
tions."' The second component should protect employers'
postimpasse, joint, unilateral imposition of terms, as well as oth-
er lawful conduct that grows out of and is directly related to the
multiemployer bargaining process, 60 but only insofar as the
conduct resists a union's effort to achieve supracompetitive
terms of employment through collective employee bargaining
power. This second component should not protect joint bargain-
ing conduct that imposes or seeks to coerce a union to agree to
impose restraints to prevent employees from bargaining freely
as individuals in a competitive labor market. 6' Therefore, this
multiemployer bargaining component of the nonstatutory exemp-
158. See id. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,
289 (1965)).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
160. Cf Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127 (employing similar language to justify the appli-
cation of the nonstatutory antitrust exemption).
161. See id. at 2129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be most ironic to ex-
tend an exemption crafted to protect collective action by employees to protect em-
ployers acting jointly to deny employees the opportunity to negotiate their salaries
individually in a competitive market.").
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tion should not distinguish between multiemployer associations
using weapons of economic coercion, such as lockouts, to achieve
restrictive employment and their imposing restrictive terms uni-
laterally and directly.
The scope of the multiemployer bargaining component of the
exemption should be no broader than is its justification.'62
Congress, the Labor Board, and the courts have approved
multiemployer bargaining in part to allow employers to join to-
gether to offset and stabilize the employee collective bargaining
power protected by the labor laws." Such bargaining has not
been approved to allow employers to achieve through joint col-
lective bargaining what the antitrust laws presumably would not
allow them to achieve through collusion outside collective bar-
gaining: the depression of employment terms below the level
that would be set in a free, competitive labor market.' As
suggested by Justice Stevens, allowing such collusion would
serve neither the goals of the labor laws nor those of the anti-
trust laws."s
162. See generally National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 688-89 (2d
Cir. 1995) (explaining the purposes of multiemployer bargaining).
163. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters
("Buffalo Linen"), 353 U.S. 87, 94-96 (1957); Richard A. Bock, Note, Multiemployer
Bargaining and Withdrawing from the Association After Bargaining Has Begun: 38
Years of "Unusual Circumstances" Under Retail Associates, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
519, 520 (1996). As stated by the Court in Buffalo Linen, the debates during consid-
eration of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA over proposals to limit or
outlaw multiemployer bargaining "demonstrate that 'Congress refused to interfere
with such bargaining because there was cogent evidence that in many industries the
multi-employer bargaining basis was a vital factor in the effectuation of the national
policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining." Buffalo
Linen, 353 U.S. at 95.
164. Cf Leslie, supra note 83, at 637 n.30 (1996) ("[C]ases involving employer car-
tel agreements in the labor market are apparently quite rare.... They may be rare
because it is widely assumed that such conduct violates the antitrust laws.").
165. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It might be argued
that the authority to impose restraints jointly on individual bargaining helps employ-
ers to resist union efforts to raise wages collectively above a competitive rate in that
employers can use the threat of restraints on individual bargaining as an induce-
ment of union agreement to a compromise on collective terms. Multiemployer bar-gaining, however, has been approved in part to stabilize the impact of collective em-
ployee bargaining power, not to minimize that power; otherwise, multiemployer bar-
gaining would be in tension with the original goal of the NLRA to allow employees
to join together to raise wages, and it would not be conditioned on union consent.
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This does not mean that employers should be vulnerable to
antitrust challenge when they induce a union to agree to em-
ployment terms that restrict the ability of some employees rep-
resented by the union to achieve benefits equal to those they
could have achieved as individuals in a competitive labor mar-
ket. The first, consent-based component of the nonstatutory ex-
emption, as approved in Jewel Tea 6 ' and developed in
Mackey, 87 should continue to apply independently of the
multiemployer bargaining component. The first component
should protect labor market restrictions that depress wages, as
well as those that inflate wages, provided a collective bargaining
agent voluntarily accepts these restrictions. The rationale for
this first component, as suggested in this Article's discussion of
Mackey, 6' derives from federal labor law's investment of the
exclusive bargaining authority of unions enjoying majority sup-
port in some appropriate bargaining unit, including one of
See Bock, supra note 163, at 519-20 (explaining that employers use multiemployer
bargaining to gain leverage when dealing with larger unions, and that such bargain-
ing potentially works to the advantage of the union by fostering security). Further-
more, allowing employers jointly to impose restraints on individual bargaining may
enable them to push wages not only down toward a competitive free market level,
but also, for at least some workers within a bargaining unit, below that level.
It also might be argued that antitrust law need not be concerned with the ag-
gregate wages of employees in a union bargaining unit being pushed below a com-
petitive level because it would not be rational for employees to continue collective
bargaining that had not raised their aggregate wages above such a level. Employees,
however, may be attracted to collective bargaining for reasons other than the en-
hancement of wages and other benefits. Moreover, in some industries, such as the
sports industry, employees rationally may conclude that collective bargaining enables
them to achieve aggregate wages above that which they could achieve through bar-
gaining as individuals against an employer cartel, even with the opportunity of un-
certain antitrust litigation. Furthermore, depressing the wages of some employees
below a competitive level may have efficient, as well as distributive, effects, even if
aggregate wages in a bargaining unit are at a competitive level. For instance, some
marginal professional football players could have been discouraged from continuing to
play football by the NFL's cap on developmental squad wages, regardless of the sal-
aries of NFL stars. In any event, the argument against antitrust liability treated in
this paragraph is based on antitrust policies, rather than labor law goals, and there-
fore should be treated as part of the antitrust analysis of particular restraints, rath-
er than as support for a blanket labor exemption.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
168. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
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multiemployer breadth."6 9 That authority, as affirmed by the
Court, includes the power to trade the bargaining advantages of
individual employees for the collective good of the bargaining
unit.170
When bargaining with single employers, unions must have
authority to trade the bargaining leverage of especially skilled
members of their unit by agreeing to a flat wage that may be
below that which those members could extract in individual bar-
gaining, but is still above that which most members of the unit
could command. When bargaining with a multiemployer unit
unions must also have authority to trade the rights of talented
individual employees in order to achieve the maximum aggre-
gate gains for represented employees. If unions did not have this
authority, employers could not agree to accept a set wage level
for a group of especially skilled employees without fear of anti-
trust liability. Collective bargaining agreements in the sports in-
dustry that incorporate restraints on individual player mobility
and bargaining trade talented players' rights under the antitrust
laws for collective benefits that may be attractive to a majority
of the bargaining unit.'
17
Commentators appropriately criticized the Mackey decision's
conditioning of the nonstatutory exemption's availability for a
challenged employment restriction on whether it was the "prod-
uct of bona fide arm's-length bargaining." 72 Implicitly, this de-
cision authorized antitrust courts to evaluate collective bargain-
ing agreements that the labor laws insulate from public re-
view. 73 The first component of the nonstatutory exemption
should encompass any employment restriction to which a union
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
170. "The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that
of the group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collec-
tivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in
practice go in as a contribution to the collective result." J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332, 339 (1944.
171. Cf Scott J. Faraker, Note, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap:
An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 163 n.38 (1985) (conceding that al-
though players do not benefit from a salary cap, the players do benefit from other
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement of which the salary cap is a part).
172. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
173. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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has agreed, for the time period it agreed to that restriction. The
courts should presume that the union received some quid pro
quo for its membership. Nevertheless, Mackey's attempt to im-
pose a "bona fide arm's-length bargaining" condition on the Jew-
el Tea exemption reflects the Eighth Circuit's understanding of
the first, union consent or trade, basis for insulating employer-
initiated labor market restrictions from antitrust challenge.174
Note, however, that, unlike the multiemployer bargaining fa-
cilitation component's insulation of all joint employer bargaining
conduct based on the collective bargaining relationship, this first
component insulates employer collusion to impose restrictions on
free, individual employee bargaining, but only insulates re-
straints for as long as agreements with unions are in effect. Em-
ployer restraints on labor markets that are not imposed to resist
union efforts to insist on collective terms should be insulated
from antitrust challenge only if the restraints retain the consent
of a collective bargaining representative.'75 A sports league,
like other multiemployer associations, should be able to impose
labor market restrictions to depress wages below a competitive
market level only for as long as the relevant players' union con-
sents.'76
174. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
175. Cf Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (1996) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (explaining that the purpose of the "limited judicial exemption" is to "accom-
modate the conflicting policies of the antitrust and labor statutes in the context of
action between employers and unions"); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975) (holding that the non-
statutory labor exemption did not apply to an agreement achieved outside of a col-
lective bargaining relationship).
176. The Brown majority, therefore, correctly rejected the suggestion of the United
States government's brief and that of some lower courts and commentators, that the
nonstatutory exemption should continue for terms agreed to by a union until, but
only until, a bargaining impasse is reached on a new collective agreement. See
Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124-25. For examples of the rejected argument, see Powell v.
National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788-89 (D. Minn. 1988) (concluding that
the labor exemption for a mandatory bargaining subject survives the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that particular
issue), rev'd on other grounds, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), and Goldman, supra
note 39, at 679-84 (suggesting that an employer's labor market restraint should not
remain exempt postimpasse unless: No party seeks to discuss the expired restraint
or the union challenges a "parallel agreement" among members of a multiemployer
bargaining group). As the Brown majority explained, however, impasse may be tern-
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In support of his view that joint employer restrictions on the
free competitive operations of union-organized labor markets
should be exempt from antitrust review, regardless of union con-
sent, Judge Winter repeatedly has asserted that the establish-
ment of a collective bargaining relationship extinguishes the
rights of bargaining unit members to bargain individually with
their employers."' He has stated that any rights to bargain
individually that exist during such a relationship must be se-
cured by the union through the collective bargaining process.'
Judge Winter's argument distorts not only the relevant labor
and antitrust law issues, but also the nature of collective bar-
gaining' in an industry like sports, where especially skilled em-
ployees bargain individually for many employment terms.' 9
First, even without being part of a collective bargaining unit,
no individual employee or employment applicant has the legal
right to bargain with any employer. An employer with no collec-
tive bargaining obligations simply may offer take-it-or-leave-it
terms to the labor market and hire those who take the terms.
The employer has full discretion under the common law to de-
cide whether it will bargain with any individual employee. 80
porary and does not necessarily mark the end of the collective bargaining process; it
therefore should not bound the period during which employers in multiemployer as-
sociations may take joint action to resist efforts by a union to achieve collective
supracompetitive benefits. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124-25; Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982). Using impasse as a temporal
boundary only would encourage unions to force an impasse through bargaining obdu-
racy. Cf. Bonanno Linen, 454 U.S. at 412 n.8 (discussing the potential for a party to
strategically "precipitate an impasse"). Absent a union's consent to extend its accep-
tance of restrictions on individual employee bargaining, however, the continued impo-
sition of such restrictions before a bargaining impasse should be no more exempt
from antitrust review than their imposition by employers after impasse. See Note,
Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Ex-
emption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874, 888-89 (1991) [hereinafter Releasing Superstars
from Peonage].
177. See Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
178. See id.; Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987);
Jacobs & Winter, supra note 83, at 7-8; see also Brief for Respondents at 16-18,
Brown (No. 95-388) (echoing Judge Winter's view).
179. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the
sports industry from other areas of labor law because player salaries are individually
negotiated).
180. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 220 (1983).
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What the establishment of a collective bargaining relationship
extinguishes is not the right of individual employees to bargain,
but rather the right of employers to bargain, absent union con-
sent, with individual employees with whom the employers would
like to bargain directly. 8' The reason for this extinguishment
is the protection of the union's exclusive bargaining status, not
the extraction of some payment from individual employees for
enjoying the benefits of collective bargaining.'82
In the sports and entertainment industries, therefore, union-
represented employees negotiate individualized employment con-
tracts not because unions have "secured" the employees' rights to
do so. This process rather occurs because the unions have
waived part of the exclusive bargaining authority, imposed by
labor law, that prevented the employers from bargaining directly
with especially talented employees as individuals. No collective
bargaining agreement in the sports or entertainment industry
grants any particular employee the right to bargain individually
with any employer that does not choose to exercise its preserved
181. Indeed, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not render illegal any
individual employee action; it condemns only an employer for circumvention of an
exclusive bargaining agent by direct dealings with individual employees. See Medo
Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944) (holding that an employer
violated its bargaining obligations under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by negotiating
wage increases with individual employees represented by a union, even though nego-
tiation was initiated by the employees).
Dictum in a Supreme Court decision upholding the authority of unions to en-
force fines against members for crossing picket lines stated that labor law policy
"extinguishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations with his
employer." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967). The reference
to "power" rather than "right" in this passage, however, reflects the legal conse-
quence of the selection of an exclusive bargaining agent; the individual employee can
have no power to bargain individually with an employer that is legally restrained
from such bargaining absent the bargaining agent's consent. Cf Medo Photo Supply,
321 U.S. at 683-84 (declaring that the employer's NLRA duty to bargain collectively
with the chosen representative of his employees implies a "negative duty to treat
with no other") (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44
(1936)). Thus, the Labor Act does not protect employee efforts to coerce an employer
to bargain with individual employees without the consent of an exclusive bargaining
representative. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 72 (1975) ("Under the [NLRA], conduct which is not protected concerted
activity may lawfully form the basis for the participants' discharge.").
182. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 83, at 8 ("Forbidding the exercise of individ-
ual bargaining is thus a means of strengthening the collectivity.").
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discretion to conduct such negotiations. For instance, no NFL
club would violate the League's collective agreement with the
football players' union if the club independently chose to offer a
low, flat wage on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to an identified group
of players." The club probably would suffer a dismal record
during the next season, but the club would not breach any term
of the League's collective bargaining agreement with the players.
More importantly, what has been at issue in cases such as
Brown is not the right of employees to bargain individually with
employers or the right of employers to bargain with individual
employees, but rather the right of individual employees to be
free from collusion by a group of competitive employers.'" Con-
trary to the assertions of Judge Winter," that right is founded
on the antitrust laws and is not created in collective bargaining
by unions.'86 For the reasons stated above, the exclusive bar-
gaining authority granted to unions by federal labor law must
include the authority to waive this right.'87 A union's exclusive
bargaining authority is contracted, however, and not expanded,
by extinguishing the right to be free from collusion directly upon
the grant of the authority. Moreover, to hold that by choosing to
be represented by a union, employees sacrifice their antitrust
rights rather than merely transfer them into the union's control
discriminates against employees for choosing collective bargain-
ing. This conflicts with labor law's goal of government neutrality
in employee choice on unions."s
Treating a union's consent to multiemployer bargaining as
consent to the waiver of rights of represented employees under
the antitrust laws to be free from employer collusion on labor
market restraints also would serve neither antitrust nor labor
law policies.'89 In the first place, such treatment would have to
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
185. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
186. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 165-71.
188. Cf. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (holding preempted by fed-
eral labor law a state law that predicated the grant of benefits on whether employ-
ees chose to refrain from collective bargaining).
189. For a brief discussion of these distinct policies, see Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2128-
29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rest on a fictional construct, as no reason would exist for union
leaders to waive such rights without first obtaining some conces-
sion from the employers. 9 ' Second, making such consent a le-
gal condition of multiemployer bargaining effectively would
abrogate antitrust rights without being necessary to encourage
multiemployer collective bargaining, as long as the antitrust
laws do not restrain joint employer resistance to union attempts
to obtain supracompetitive benefits through collective employee
leverage.
Nor would it be sensible to allow multiemployer associations,
such as sports leagues, to pressure unions to agree to the waiver
of represented employees' antitrust rights. As suggested by
Judge Winter in Williams,9' if a multiemployer association
acts as an illegal cartel in proposing and implementing labor
market restrictions, it surely must be acting illegally when it re-
sorts to economic force to enforce the restrictions.'92 Further-
more, the purposes of neither the Mackey union-trade
component,'93 nor the Williams facilitate multiemployer bar-
gaining component,' of the nonstatutory exemption would be
served by allowing employers to engage in joint economic coer-
cion, such as lockouts, to pressure the waiver of antitrust rights.
Such pressure does not enable unions to trade antitrust rights
freely for collective benefits,'95 nor is the allowance of such
pressure necessary to enable multiemployer associations to re-
sist employee collectivization of the labor market.'96
190. As noted below, however, by agreeing to make adequate concessions, a
multiemployer association, such as a sports league, should be able to extract a long-
term waiver before commencing collective bargaining on a new collective agreement.
See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
191. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996).
192. See id. at 692 ("A cartel that proposes common terms hardly ceases to be a
cartel when it resorts to economic force to enforce those terms. If anything, the re-
sort to economic force enhances rather than diminishes the effect on competition.").
193. See generally supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text (discussing the decision
in Mackey).
194. See generally supra notes 79-99 and accompanying text (discussing the decision
in Williams).
195. No bargainer's authority to trade is enhanced by the protection of its bargain-
ing adversary's power to coerce.
196. Allowing employee antitrust suits against coercive tactics of multiemployer as-
sociations that are directed toward obtaining agreements on individual bargaining
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It is also revealing that labor law does not distinguish be-
tween the unilateral imposition of terms and the use of economic
pressure to obtain the same terms.9 ' The Supreme Court has
limited the statutory obligation to bargain collectively to those
"mandatory" topics included within the "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" phrase in section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act.'98 If the Act classifies a par-
ticular topic as being a "mandatory" topic, both parties must
negotiate about it in good faith, 99 either party may use eco-
nomic pressure to impel the other side to compromise, 00 and,
generally, neither party may attempt unilaterally to implement
its proposals concerning the topic until impasse occurs.'' The
Act also permits bargaining on topics outside of the mandatory
scope.0 2 If the Act classifies a topic as a permissive topic for
bargaining, although it may be the basis for a negotiated, volun-
tary compromise between the parties, neither party has a legal
restraints need not expose employers to any uncertainty about whether they could
be subject to antitrust challenge even after obtaining the union's agreement to such
restraints. The law could include a rebuttable presumption that the associations did
not coerce the union's actual agreement to the labor restraints. The presumption
might be rebutted only by an express clause in the agreement stating that the un-
ion preserved an antitrust suit against the multiemplayer association's tactics in se-
curing the agreement. See Releasing Superstars from Peonage, supra note 176, at
887 & n.88. The clarity of such a presumption is probably worth the costs of forcing
a union wanting to preserve the antitrust option to refuse to enter into an unquali-
fied agreement before initiating suit against coercive employer tactics to obtain such
an agreement. In any event, labor law generally authorizes the Labor Board, and
reviewing courts, to make judgments about whether a party used coercive tactics
over permissive terms. See, e.g., Curry, 184 N.L.R.B. 976, 977 (1970) (ruling that the
conduct of negotiations on a basis broader than the established bargaining unit is
not mandatory and that the union's insistence that the employer engage in such
bargaining violated the NLRA), rev'd sub nom. AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Comm.
for Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1972).
197. See infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
198. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).
199. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 742-43; Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
200. See Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349 ("[W]ithin that area neither party is
legally obligated to yield.").
201. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 747 ("Unilateral action by an employer without prior
discussion with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected
conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargain-
ing, contrary to the congressional policy.").
202. See Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349.
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obligation to bargain about it and neither party may use eco-
nomic pressure to induce compromise on the topic. Further, the
party that would control the topic without labor law bargaining
obligations can exercise unilateral control over it at any time,
before or after negotiations, and without regard to bargaining
impasse."'
An antitrust court should treat the waiver of antitrust rights
as labor law treats a permissive topic of bargaining within the
legal control of a union. A union's uncoerced agreement to waive
antitrust rights through acceptance of labor market restraints,
like its agreement to trade any permissive term within its con-
trol, should be legally enforceable. Employers' efforts to coerce
union agreement to labor market restraints, however, whether
through lockouts or through unilateral implementation of such
restraints, should not be insulated from antitrust challenge. As
explained above, granting unions exclusive bargaining authority
must entail giving them control over the antitrust rights of rep-
resented employees.0 4 This same authority must also allow
unions to trade these rights for benefits to the collective unit
they represent.0 5 The authority, however, does not require
subjecting antitrust rights to the economic pressures of bargain-
ing any more than it requires subjecting employee rights secured
by other statutes to such pressures.0 6
203. The critical decisions establishing this doctrine are, of course, Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. at 348-50 and Katz, 369 U.S. at 742-48. For a more complete state-
ment of the consequences of defining a subject as "mandatory" or "permissive," see
Michael C. Harper, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain Concerning Business
Transformations, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE: THEORETICAL AND TRANSAC-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES 25, 26-27 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988).
204. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
205. Cf. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-16 (8th Cir. 1976)
(allowing an employer to utilize the nonstatutory exemption when the challenged
restraint is the product of a quid pro quo bargain).
206. In a series of cases, the Court has held that unions do not relinquish
employees' independent statutory claims by the negotiation of private grievance ar-
bitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1987) (allowing a personal injury dam-
age action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994));
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (allowing a
minimum wage claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1994)); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (allowing a
claim against status discrimination under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
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Treating the waiver of antitrust rights as if it were a permis-
sive topic of bargaining and yet exempting from antitrust law
employer-initiated restrictions voluntarily accepted by a union is
not in tension with the plurality opinions in Jewel Tea. °7 Both
of these opinions considered the legally mandatory nature of
bargaining over hours of employment as at least a factor weigh-
ing in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements setting such
hours."8 Both opinions, however, considered the labor law re-
quirement of mandatory bargaining over hours of employment
as relevant to whether the union-requested restrictions in Jewel
Tea concerned controlling the labor market to benefit employees,
rather than controlling the product market to benefit some em-
ployers." 9 As explained above, the labor market versus product
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). Of course, in these cases, the Court indicated that the union
would not have authority to waive the rights at issue. See Buell, 480 U.S. at 564-65;
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740; Alexander 415 U.S. at 51-52. None of these cases, how-
ever, involved rights to challenge an agreement to restructure employment terms to
benefit most members of the unit at the possible expense of the most skilled, and
thus, none challenged the basic exclusive bargaining authority of unions. See, e.g.,
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737 ("[Dlifferent considerations apply where the employee's
claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum sub-
stantive guarantees to individual workers.").
It is also true that the Labor Board and the courts have held that no-strike
clauses are mandatory topics of bargaining, even though they constitute a waiver of
individual employee rights secured under the NLRA. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. at 349-50; NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 879 (9th
Cir. 1978). The right to strike, however, is secured by the same statutory scheme
that allows the compromise of that right in collective agreements, and this compro-
mise is central to the accommodation and industrial stabilization secured by most
such agreements. Cf Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 24748 (1970) (explaining that a no-strike obligation is the quid pro quo for the
employer's submission of grievance disputes to arbitration and that absent such
agreements, actions for damages would "tend to aggravate industrial strife and delay
an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.").
207. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N.
Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). For a general discussion of the Jewel
Tea case, see supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
208. For Justice White, the factor deserved heavy weight. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S.
at 689-91 (White, J., plurality opinion). For Justice Goldberg, it was critical. See Ud
at 709-10, 729-32 (Goldberg, J., plurality opinion).
209. This distinction was evident on the face of Justice White's opinion. See id. at
689-94 (White, J., plurality opinion). As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in
Brown, it was also the intent of Justice Goldberg's opinion. Cf Brown v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe main theme
of [Justice Goldberg's opinion in Jewel Tea] was that the antitrust laws should not
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market distinction is not at issue in cases like Brown in which
employer-initiated restraints on the labor market are chal-
lenged.21
Furthermore, an antitrust court's treatment of the waiver of
antitrust rights as if the waiver were a permissive topic of bar-
gaining on which a multiemployer association cannot insist
would be fully consistent with labor law treating the market
restraints desired by the employers as mandatory topics of bar-
gaining that the employers could impose unilaterally
postimpasse.21" ' A union's agreement to labor market restraints
and its concomitant waiver of antitrust rights, not the restraints
themselves, should be treated as the permissive term. This dis-
tinction is not important for labor law's treatment of an employ-
er association's economic coercion of union agreement and insis-
tence on terms during bargaining; insistence on union
agreement to the terms should be treated as tantamount to in-
sistence on union waiver of represented employees' antitrust
rights. The distinction is important, however, to the treatment of
postimpasse unilateral imposition. If, following the lead of the
antitrust exemption suggested here, the Labor Board and the
labor law courts found an unfair labor practice in the attempt to
coerce union agreement to the waiver of employee antitrust
rights, then the postimpasse, unilateral imposition of a system
of restraints on individual bargaining would not have to be
treated as an unfair labor practice. The unilaterally imposed
restraints would be subject to antitrust scrutiny, but the
multiemployer association could obtain antitrust review of the
reasonableness of its desired labor market restraints without
committing an unfair labor practice."2
be used to circumscribe bargaining over union demands.").
210. See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
211. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
212. The Labor Board would not have to follow the lead suggested by the labor
exemption from antitrust law; the Labor Board would not have to find an employer's
insistence on a union's agreement to labor market restrictions to be an unfair labor
practice. Every collective bargaining tactic that is an antitrust violation need not be
a labor law violation. If, however, a union's agreement to restrictive labor market
terms is a mandatory topic for bargaining under labor law, then the union must be
willing to negotiate in good faith about, though not necessarily concede to, such an
agreement. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349
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In sum, the labor exemption should serve the labor law goal of
protecting employees' freedom to choose whether to join together
to attempt to control their labor market to raise their benefits
above the level that would be set by a fully competitive mar-
ket.21 This requires the insulation from antitrust challenge of
concerted employee action directed toward such labor market
control.214 It also requires the insulation of agreements of em-
ployers with unions to accept enhanced benefits.215
Protecting employees' freedom of collective action does not,
however, require the insulation from antitrust challenge of em-
ployer collusion to depress benefit levels by restricting the free
operation of labor markets, except in either of two limited cir-
cumstances. First, any agreements among or between employers
to restrain labor markets should be insulated from antitrust
challenge when the collective bargaining representative of the
affected employees consents to the restraints in presumed ex-
change for other collective employee benefits."6 Second, be-
cause the processes of multiemployer collective bargaining can
enhance union efforts to control labor markets, 17 the labor ex-
emption should protect these processes by insulating joint em-
ployer tactics to resist union attempts to insist on particular
collective terms, even when the union does not consent to the
tactics. Protecting from antitrust challenge agreements among or
between employers not to compete for the services of individual
employees represented by a union that authorizes and seeks
such competition, however, serves no labor law goal.
(1958). Because such an obligation to bargain seems in tension with the union's con-
trol over the antitrust rights of represented employees, in my view, the Supreme
Court ideally would have made the antitrust and labor laws congruent on this issue
by appropriately phrased dictum in the decision that should have been engendered
by the Brown litigation.
213. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the basic
premise of national labor policy).
214. See id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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C.
The foregoing two-part theory of the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption not only is coherent, but also would be fully practical.
Unlike the theory advanced by the plaintiffs in Brown, adoption
of the above theory could not threaten multiemployer collective
bargaining outside of the sports industry. Other than players'
unions in professional team sports, only unions representing
actors and other performing artists in the entertainment indus-
try normally negotiate collective agreements that allow talented
performers to bargain individually for special compensation and
other terms of employment.21 Even in the entertainment in-
dustry, multiemployer associations have not sought to impose
joint restraints on maximum compensation or on employee mo-
bility between employers.219 Outside of the sports industry, em-
ployers use joint bargaining in multiemployer associations not to
impose restraints on the ability of individual employees to ob-
tain compensation that would be offered by a free competitive
labor market, but only to resist union efforts to use collective
employee leverage to achieve supracompetitive wages.Y°
In line with labor law theory and doctrine, adopting the more
limited nonstatutory labor exemption advanced above would pro-
tect unions' ability to achieve supracompetitive wages by trading
the bargaining advantages of individual bargaining unit mem-
bers for collective benefits, without also impeding the ability of
218. See, e.g., H.A. Artists Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 707 (1981)
("[A]n actor or actress is free to negotiate wages or terms more favorable than the
collectively bargained minima.").
219. Collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the entertainment industry with
unions representing actors, directors and writers set minimum terms of employment,
but allow talented individuals to negotiate additional compensation and other perqui-
sites. See, e.g., id. These agreements do not cap salaries or otherwise restrict what
any particular employer can offer. See Alan Paul & Archie Kleingartner, The Trans-
formation of Industrial Relations in the Motion Picture and Television Industries:
Talent Sector, in UNDER THE STARS: ESSAYS ON LAROR RELATIONS IN ARTS AND EN-
TERTAINMENT 156, 161-66 (Lois S. Gray & Ronald L. Seeber eds., 1996); Jan Wilson,
Special Effects of Unions in Hollywood, 12 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 403, 407 (1992). This
is the reason that performers in the entertainment industry have not brought anti-
trust challenges against the joint imposition of terms or other bargaining tactics of
multiemployer associations. See Brief of the Alliance at 5-7, Brown (No. 95-388).
220. Cf Brief of the Alliance at 6-7, Brown (No. 95-388) (distinguishing
multiemployer bargaining in the sports and motion picture industries).
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multiemployer bargaining associations to employ joint tactics to
resist unions using the collective leverage of unit members. A
union could threaten or actually use represented employees' an-
titrust actions to prevent employers from eliminating individual
bargaining leverage through joint restraints.22' As long as a
multiemployer association did not impose or attempt to coerce
union agreement to restraints on individual bargaining, howev-
er, the association could use joint bargaining tactics without con-
cern of antitrust liability.
Assume, for instance, that the union bargaining with Judge
Winter's hypothetical multiemployer association of printers
seeks to utilize antitrust law by demanding not only a minimum
ten percent pay increase, but also an opportunity for every rep-
resented employee to bargain individually for a wage higher
than this minimum." The multiemployer association would
not face antitrust scrutiny for attempting to coerce the union to
forego the first demand."' The association would be subject to
antitrust review for attempting to coerce a sacrifice of the second
demand,2" but this challenge would only preserve the union's
leverage in gaining the association's agreement to the first de-
mand, to the extent that the association worried about the abili-
ty of individual employees to command, through individual bar-
gaining, increases beyond the ten percent sought by the union
for all represented employees. This replicates the balance of bar-
gaining between a union and a single employer who may be per-
suaded by the special talents of a few employees to grant a wage
increase to all employees only to the extent that those few em-
ployees could command through individual bargaining more
221. Contrary to the claims of the NFL in Brown, see Brief for Respondents at 29-
32, Brown (No. 95-388), it is fully appropriate for a union to use the antitrust laws
to protect the bargaining leverage that individual players would enjoy in a free com-
petitive labor market in order to trade some of that leverage to serve the union's
collective bargaining goals. Doing so may serve the antitrust goal of more competi-
tive markets, the labor law goal of more effective collective bargaining, or more like-
ly both, because the players' labor market is less restrained and some collective ben-
efits are secured.
222. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1995)
(contrasting the printing industry with the sports industry).
223. See id.
224. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336, 338 (1944).
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than the general wage increase.
Assuming, as is likely, that only the employees' collective le-
verage concerned the printers' association, the association could
bargain to impasse over a smaller collective increase, or no in-
crease at all, implement its last collective proposal, and allow
individual employers to bargain with individual employees,
knowing that any such individual bargaining would not under-
mine the collective wage level that it was imposing. If the union
chose to strike against one of the printers, then the association
could impose a lockout of all the printers' employees as long as
the union demanded the ten percent increase in addition to indi-
vidual bargaining.2 5 Whether or not the association imposed a
lockout, given the absence of individual employee bargaining le-
verage, the printers' association need not be concerned about the
union using individual bargaining to whipsaw the employer tar-
geted by the strike to raise the general wage level above the lev-
el imposed by the association. In any event, the union would
risk eroding strike solidarity by allowing individual employees to
bargain to their best deal with the targeted employer; the em-
ployer could undermine the strike by giving special wage induce-
ments to more valued workers. Moreover, the association should
be able to enforce antitrust-insulated sanctions, such as agreed-
upon fines or boycotts, on the targeted employer for bargaining
collectively with the union for a wage increase for all its employ-
ees beyond that imposed by the association."'
225. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
("Buffalo Linen"), 353 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1957) (holding that members of a
multiemployer association could lock out their employees even if the strike was
against only other members of the association).
226. The printing employers would not need to be concerned that the independent
refusal of each printing employer to negotiate higher wages with individual employ-
ees could be used by the employees as evidence of an agreement among the printing
employers to restrict such bargaining. It is true that antitrust courts will permit a
finding of agreement based on parallel behavior when there are additional "plus fac-
tors", including the opportunity to collude, that tend to show concerted action. See,
e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221, 232 (1939) (dis-
cussing concerted action through conscious parallelism). An antitrust court could not,
however, infer agreement from employers refusing to engage in individual bargaining
in an industry, such as printing or trucking, in which employers always have found
it to their advantage as independent firms to offer only set wages for particular
jobs. Only in industries such as sports or entertainment, in which individual bar-
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In the sports industry in which employers have sought to im-
pose labor market restrictions in response to their concern with
individual player bargaining leverage, adoption of the more lim-
ited, nonstatutory, labor exemption advanced above would
change collective bargaining from its pre-Brown status. To the
extent that the owners of professional sports clubs wished to
ensure the insulation of the joint imposition of a labor market
restriction by means of the nonstatutory exemption, they would
know that they would have to purchase that insulation from the
union representing their players. Moreover, at least in the near
term, that purchase probably would have to come at an even
higher price than the purchase of the ambiguously bounded ex-
emption for which the leagues negotiated before the Brown deci-
sion clarified its breadth. In order to reduce the cost of union
consent, sports leagues would have to establish through litiga-
tion that some joint system, such as revenue sharing between
teams or perhaps flexible salary caps, did not violate the anti-
trust laws because each league reasonably restrained labor mar-
ket competition to ensure competitive games between clubs with
variant-sized fan populations.
Adoption of the more limited exemption described here, how-
ever, would neither threaten the existence of multiemployer bar-
gaining in the sports industry nor effect an inappropriate level
of revenue distribution from professional sports clubs to their
players. Multiemployer bargaining in sports certainly would not
be disrupted. As a joint venture of competitive teams, each
sports league would continue to bargain jointly with a union rep-
resenting its players in order to ensure a consistent, competitive
product."'
gaining with nonfungible employees would be expected without agreement, would it
be appropriate to infer agreement from the parallel refusal of employers to negotiate.
227. See supra note 107. In my view, employment conditions that define the sports
product offered to fans, such as the designated hitter rule in baseball or the use of
hand-checks in basketball, should not be mandatory topics for bargaining with a un-
ion. See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National
Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1465-71
(1982). Even if this view is correct, however, a league may wish to bargain over
such topics. Furthermore, even a league that does not seek to impose limits on the
benefits its players can achieve through individual bargaining will want to have all
its clubs offering the same collective terms of employment, such as minimum sala-
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Moreover, continual focus on the purchase of the union's
agreement to labor market restraints would not inhibit such
bargaining. The duration of a union's waiver of the antitrust
claims of represented players would not exceed the period
agreed to by the union."8 The union's permission, however,
would need not be limited to the duration of a collective bargain-
ing agreement governing all the terms relating to the players'
relationships with the clubs. The waiver could extend for as long
as the union agreed and as long as the union continued to be the
players' exclusive bargaining representative. The waiver certain-
ly could extend past any impasse in the bargaining of a particu-
lar collective agreement, and it could be extended by further ne-
gotiations independent of the negotiations of any particular com-
prehensive agreement. Similarly, the collective benefit ex-
changed, whether it be some sharing of league revenues with all
players or some enhancement in league pension contributions,
would not have to be identical in duration. Collective bargaining
is flexible; labor law never has required the parties to bound all
their commitments with the same temporal limits. 9 No rea-
son exists to restrict this flexibility when a union waives a stat-
utory right that is under its control by virtue of its exclusive
representative status."'
ties or pension contributions, to benefit players who move between clubs.
228. In accordance with the treatment of the union's waiver as a permissive term,
the waiver could be withdrawn without further bargaining to impasse. See NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (holding that the proscription on preimpasse unilater-
al changes applies only to mandatory terms).
229. Indeed, the fact that the prohibition of unilateral changes before impasse ap-
plies only to mandatory topics of bargaining, see supra note 228, means that the
NLRA must contemplate the permissive terms of a collective agreement having dif-
ferent effective durational bounds than mandatory terms. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 748.
230. The players' lawyers in Brown suggested in a cryptic sentence in their brief to
the Supreme Court that, if the players' claims were allowed, then "agreements" with
willing unions could assuage the "fears" of multiemployer associations in industries
other than sports that antitrust claims would be brought against their postimpasse
unilateral imposition of terms. See Brief for Petitioners at 39, Brown v. Pro Football,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996) (No. 95-388). This suggestion actually may have been
the players' best attempt to address the argument that allowing their claims would
disrupt established multiemployer bargaining in other industries. Had the players'
lawyers' theory been adopted by the Court, many, if not most, employers interested
in multiemployer bargaining in industries outside sports, before consenting to such
bargaining, probably would have been able to extract from a union, that itself de-
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The expiration of a union's waiver without the negotiation of
an extension would mean that the league could not continue im-
plementation of restrictions on the players' labor market, includ-
ing salary caps and restrictions on mobility between teams,
without exposing itself to antitrust challenge. This situation
would exist even for those restrictions that first had been imple-
mented under a collective agreement with the union during a
period when the union's waiver was in effect. Contrary to the
claims of Judge Winter in Williams,"l however, even if expira-
tion occurred before an impasse in collective bargaining for a
new agreement, employers need not be placed in a dilemma be-
tween exposure to violation of the antitrust or labor laws. Labor
law does require that employers continue the status quo on most
mandatory terms in an expired collective agreement until the
bargaining parties reach impasse in negotiating a new agree-
ment.22 Antitrust courts, however, could condition lifting the
employers' antitrust exemption on the union's willingness to ac-
sired multiemployer bargaining, an agreement not to use the antitrust laws against
the joint imposition of terms. The players' lawyers, however, did not adequately ex-
plain why employers in industries outside sports should have to risk the uncertain-
ties of bargaining to obtain an exemption from the antitrust laws that the Court
could grant directly.
231. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 692 (1995) (stating
that applying antitrust principles to multiemployer bargaining would lead to per se
violations of the Sherman Act).
232. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 739 (1962), the Court approved the Board's
determination that an employer violates the NLRA by unilaterally changing a con-
dition of employment without first bargaining to impasse. This change occurred after
the union's certification as a bargaining representative and before the parties negoti-
ated their first agreement. See id. The Court, however, has acknowledged the exten-
sion of the Katz doctrine to cases in which existing terms were set in an expired
agreement. See, e.g., Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991).
The fact that the Katz doctrine applies only to mandatory rather than permis-
sive topics of bargaining, see Katz, 369 U.S. at 747-48, would not free employers
from the dilemma described in the text. No one would argue that employers have no
obligation to bargain over restrictions on the free operation of their employees' labor
market. Even if the union should be able to reject such restrictions without bargain-
ing, an employer should not be able to implement the restrictions without bargain-
ing. In any event, as suggested above, see supra notes 200-12 and accompanying
text, the Labor Board would protect legitimate employer interests better by treating
the restrictions themselves, as opposed to the union's waiver of antitrust claims
against the restrictions, as mandatory topics for purposes of employer unilateral im-
plementation after impasse.
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cept the employers' elimination of the labor market restrictions
to which it had agreed in prior negotiations."3 Because the
purpose of the labor law restriction on unilateral change prior to
impasse is to protect the union's exclusive bargaining authori-
ty,' the union should be as free to waive the restriction as it
is to waive antitrust claims of represented employees. 5
233. Players' unions easily could make such an acceptance clear. Consider, for in-
stance, the following statement in a September 15, 1993, letter from Robert W.
Goodenow, Executive Director of the National Hockey League Players' Association, to
National Hockey League Commissioner Gary B. Bettman:
First, the Association is ready to continue to negotiate in good faith after
the [Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)] expires. However, consistent
with the Players' Association's position throughout negotiations, now that
the CBA has expired, please understand that we do not agree or consent
to a continuation of those terms of the expired CBA that establish re-
straints on competition for player services. We also expressly waive any
rights under the labor laws that we may have to object to a change to
such restraints prior to a lawful impasse.
Brief of the National Hockey League as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
app. at la, Brown (No. 95-388).
234. Cf Katz, 369 U.S. at 742 ("[A]n employer's unilateral change in conditions of
employment negotiation is similarly a violation of [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994)], for
it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of [29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)] much as does a flat refusal."). Contrary to the claims of some
commentators, therefore, see, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39, at 664 n.236, it is not
somehow unfair to allow a union to authorize unilateral changes on some terms of
an agreement and not on others. A sports league that trades some collective bene-
fits, such as pension fund contributions, for restrictions on free individual player bar-
gaining, should do so with full awareness that the duration of its pension fund obli-
gations may be greater than the duration of the union's agreement to the restric-
tions. Of course, depending on the bargain struck by the league, see supra note 228
and accompanying text, the duration of the union's agreement to the restrictions
could also be greater than the duration of the pension fund obligations, which would
cease with a bargaining impasse on a new general agreement.
235. Conditioning on union consent the exemption of multiemployer restraints on
free individual bargaining also would not lead to a proliferation of litigation on the
question of whether restraints imposed by employers were within the scope of the
union's consent. Collective bargaining agreements in the sports industry have speci-
fied systems of restraints on player mobility and salaries. See, e.g., Williams, 45
F.3d at 686 (discussing the restraining effect of the right of first refusal). Before
Brown, there had been no reported antitrust litigation over whether league-imposed
restraints were consistent with contractual specifications. In any event, under the ex-
emption established in Brown, a union can advance a similar issue: whether the
restraints unilaterally imposed by a league are consistent with the proposals made
by the league in collective bargaining. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126. If the re-
straints are not consistent, their unilateral implementation would not be an accept-
able bargaining strategy under the labor laws and thus would not be exempt under
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Adopting the limited exemption advocated here also would not
lead to the transfer to players of a level of revenues that should
be deemed excessive under governing social policy. The level of
revenues that a league would transfer to the collectivity of play-
ers in order to purchase antitrust immunity for its joint imposi-
tion of labor market restraints would be bounded by the bar-
gaining leverage that its players would have as individuals in a
free competitive labor market. This is the price for the purchase
of the players' services that an antitrust plaintiff would contend
best ensures an adequate supply of talent with which to satisfy
consumersY6 As explained above, federal labor law policy does
not provide a reason to question this contention.17 If a judg-
ment is to be made that the antitrust laws should not protect
labor markets, as well as product markets, then that judgment
should be made for all labor markets, not just those subject to
multiemployer collective bargaining." 8 Alternatively, if a judg-
ment is to be made that ensuring adequate competitive balance
among professional sports clubs justifies at least some league-
imposed restraints, then that judgment should be made through
the analysis of particular restraints, not by a blanket exemption
unsupported by federal labor policyY9
the Brown holding. See id Moreover, unions are more likely to support litigation
that challenges league action in the absence of an agreement than to support action
that purports to comply with the terms of an agreement.
236. See supra note 12.
237. See supra note 12.
238. Admittedly, Congress did not enact federal labor laws to ensure that highly
compensated, especially talented workers could command even higher salaries; how-
ever, neither did Congress pass those laws to justify the depression of any workers'
wages below a competitive free market level. If we wish to facilitate the suppression
of the extraordinary salaries of superstars in team sports, we should be forced to do
so directly, rather than through a dubious exemption from general legal doctrine
founded on the same economic doctrine used to justify the extraordinary salaries
achieved by other American "superstars," including those who excel in individual
sports such as golf, tennis, and auto racing, as well as movie stars and corporate
executives.
239. In my view, adequate competitive balance between clubs representing more lu-
crative, major markets and those representing less lucrative, smaller markets, should
be able to be maintained-without salary caps-by some level of revenue sharing
between clubs. Revenue sharing inhibits player salaries by reducing the clubs' incen-
tive to compete to sign the best players in order to have a winning team that can
attract more fan support. The inhibition is indirect, however, and will be limited as
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V.
The actual holding in Brown likely will have limited direct
impact outside of the sports industry. As emphasized above, in
most other industries, employers have no interest in agreeing
not to compete with higher salaries for the employment of espe-
cially talented, unionized workers."' Aside from sports, only in
the entertainment industry have unions reserved the freedom of
especially talented, represented employees to negotiate compen-
sation and perquisites that exceed those guaranteed in collective
agreements. 1
Within the entertainment industry, multiemployer bargaining
long as all revenues are not shared and entrepreneurs with large egos continue to
be attracted to the world of professional team sports. See, e.g., Norman Chad, NFL's
Two Biggest Egos Set to Clash Sunday, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 26, 1996, at B3, avail-
able in 1996 WL 3394023 (describing the desire of the "two biggest egos in football"
to destroy each other as presenting a "duel" on the scale of "Beta vs. VHS"). Reve-
nue sharing thus is likely to enable sports leagues to achieve more competitive bal-
ance for each dollar of player salary suppression than can any direct labor market
restraint, including any form of salary cap.
For a theoretical argument that the competitive balance achieved within a
sports league with restrictions on player mobility will not be greater than that in a
league allowing the free movement of players, but also allowing revenue sharing
through the free sale of player contracts, see JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY
DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 240-83 (1992). Quirk and Fort
also offer empirical support for their theory in a statistical analysis of comparative
winning percentages before and after the elimination of restrictions on free agency in
baseball and basketball. See id. at 284-93; see also SCULLY, supra note 12, at 93-97
(1989) (rejecting empirically the hypothesis that the freer labor market in baseball
has lessened competition on the field); Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73
MINN. L. REv. 643, 671-78 (1989) (analyzing baseball and football and supporting the
same conclusion).
Of course, some labor market restrictions sought by sports leagues may have
procompetitive justifications other than the maintenance of competitive balance on
the field, court, or rink. For instance, restrictions on baseball player mobility for sev-
eral years at the beginning of a major league career encourages the clubs' develop-
ment of the skills of players through a minor league system. Cf SCULLY, supra note
12, at 194 ("The farm system permitted the monopolization of playing talent
and . . . choked off the competitive supply of players to [other, smaller] clubs.").
Rookie drafts not only help maintain competitive balance, they also help engage fan
interest.
240. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
241. Cf Hd. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 707
(1981) (noting that individual actors and actresses may "negotiate wages or terms
more favorable than the collectively bargained minima").
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has been common in film production and music recording,242
and Brown conceivably could encourage major movie or record-
ing production studios to agree to emulate the efforts of profes-
sional sport clubs by imposing mutual restraints on their compe-
tition for talent.2" Multiemployer associations in the entertain-
ment industry, however, would have significant difficulty de-
pressing salaries under the cover of the Brown holding, primari-
ly because entertainment production companies, in contrast with
clubs in a professional sports league, are not engaged in a joint
venture in which the economic success of each depends upon the
economic success of others. The more purely competitive struc-
ture of the entertainment industry has two relevant effects.
First, entertainment production companies would have diffi-
culty sustaining an effective cartel. Because they are not en-
gaged in a joint venture as are professional sports leagues, en-
tertainment companies are not legally or practically compelled to
bargain jointly2 4 and would have an advantage in luring stars
to their productions by remaining outside of a multiemployer
association that bargained for salary restraints." Indeed, star
performers may be able to raise capital to start their own pro-
duction companies to challenge any cartel that attempts to sup-
press their wages. Producers might imagine that they could bet-
ter restrain the salaries of talent that cannot claim star status;
but how any system could be structured to allow production
242. Multiemployer bargaining generally has not been practiced in television, radio,
and live entertainment. See Lois Gray & Ronald Seeber, Introduction to UNDER THE
STARS, supra note 219, at 1, 9.
243. In their amicus brief in Brown, the entertainment unions predicted that the
major movie studios would collude to limit the extra income actors, writers, and di-
rectors could derive from the profits of films and from the "residual" returns of films
in other media such as video cassettes and television. See Brief of Amici Curiae the
Screen Actors Guild, Inc. et al. at 7-9, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116
(1996) (No. 95-388).
244. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
245. Before the birth of the Screen Actors Guild in the 1930s, the major movie stu-
dios agreed to impose strict restraints on the salaries and mobility of actors between
studios. Cf Wilson, supra note, 219, at 408-09 (describing the harsh environment of
early Hollywood). During this period, actors signed contracts to perform for only one
studio for some period, rather than negotiating separate deals for individual movie
projects. See id. at 408. Neither the present economics of the industry nor the
strong actors' unions would allow a return to the 1930s system. See Brief of the
Alliance at 3-5, Brown (No. 95-388).
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companies to compete without restraints for stars, but not allow
unrestrained competition for others in the same bargaining unit
is unclear. 6
Second, if entertainment production companies started to
achieve effective salary restraints through multiemployer bar-
gaining associations," any union representing talent whose
salaries had been limited would have the option to withdraw
from multiemployer bargaining, and presumably thereby eimi-
nate the studios' antitrust exemption."5 The union would have
to sacrifice the benefits of multiemployer bargaining, including
the establishment of consistent minimum terms for all pro-
jects. 9 Unlike a players' union in the sports industry, howev-
er, the entertainment union would not have to terminate collec-
tive bargaining totally in order to escape the insulation directly
provided by Brown."
Within the sports industry, however, the Brown holding may
directly affect sports fans as well as professional athletes. Good
reason exists to predict that Brown will result in both more
strikes and more lockouts. As stressed in the briefs filed in
Brown,"' baseball, under the cover of a blanket antitrust ex-
emption, historically has been plagued by more work stoppages
than other sports, especially before lower courts developed the
exemption for sports labor markets that the Court confirmed in
Brown." After Brown,- players' unions in other sports, de-
prived of the threat of antitrust litigation, will depend more on
246. In contrast to what has proven attractive to sports clubs, see infra note 255,
for instance, movie production companies probably would hesitate to impose caps on
the aggregate percentage of returns from individual movies or programs that could
be distributed to union-represented talent. Producers probably would want the free-
dom to vary percentages depending on the extent to which the film attracted view-
ers through the identity of particular talent.
247. It is most plausible that producers would have success capping the compensa-
tion of less visible talent in separate bargaining units. Brown, for instance, might
provide an effective cover for agreements between movie production companies to
limit the compensation of script writers whose individual talents can command dif-
ferent salaries, but whose reputations do not command the loyalties of fans.
248. See Brief of the Alliance at 5-6, Brown (No. 95-388).
249. See id. at 6.
250. But see infra text accompanying note 273.
251. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 44, Brown (No. 95-388).
252. See id.; supra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
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strikes to exert leverage in bargaining. 3 Furthermore, the
holding in Brown assures the leagues that they can engage in
lockouts that are legal under federal labor laws to attempt to
compel the players' unions to accept labor market restraints.'
To be sure, the labor laws contemplate the private resolution
of disagreements under the pressure of economic weapons such
as strikes and lockouts, and the initiation of antitrust litigation
may protract a bargaining process that would have been more
quickly resolved through a painful work stoppage. The sports
fan, however, cares primarily about the continuation of uninter-
rupted athletic competition and little about whether the unions
and management sign collective bargaining agreements later
under the pressure of an antitrust threat that might add to judi-
cial dockets rather than sooner, without judicial involvement. 5
253. See Brief for Petitioners at 44-45, Brown (No. 95-388).
254. Even before the Court's decision in Brown, some evidence existed that the
broad exemption that Brown granted would encourage the use of lockouts in the
sports industry. In the wake of the Williams decision providing to the NBA basically
the same broad antitrust exemption confirmed in Brown, see supra notes 79-99 and
accompanying text, the NBA owners jointly implemented a lockout of the players in
an attempt to secure the players' union's agreement to a tightening of the NBA's
salary cap. See John Helyar, Power Plays: Pro Basketball Loses Its 'Feel Good' Image
in Nasty Labor Dispute, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at Al. The NBA and its players'
union, however, finally concluded a new collective agreement, after the Supreme
Court's Brown decision in the summer of 1996, after only a brief, 10 minute lockout.
See Clifton Brown, Deal Is a Lock, Not a Lockout, For the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1996, at Bll.
255. Of course, sports fans also care about the price of tickets to games, and the
owners of sports teams are wont to claim that restraints on player salaries help
them reduce the fares they charge their consumers. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note
239, at 219. In fact this claim does not make economic sense. See id. In the short
run, assuming a set number of teams, games, and stadium seats, profit-maximizing
club owners will set ticket prices to maximize revenues, regardless of the salaries
paid to their players. See id. at 220. The owners will offer salaries to players no
greater than their expected marginal contributions to revenue. See id. If economically
rational owners can hire players for less, they will do so to increase profits, not to
reduce prices. See id. at 219-23 (offering empirical evidence that enhanced player
mobility in baseball has not correlated with increased ticket prices). Teams often use
the interest engendered by the signing of an expensive free agent, such as Albert
Belle or Roger Clemens, as an occasion for raising ticket prices. See id. at 221. This
ticket price increase only suggests, however, that the movement of players between
teams enhances the value of sports tickets for fans. See id. at 221-22.
In the long run, of course, team owners can change the amount of sports prod-
uct offered to fans through some form of expansion or contraction. See id. Such ac-
tion is economically rational with attention to the marginal factor costs of the
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In addition, the ultimate resolution of antitrust challenges to
sports labor market restraints might have provided a structure
for future collective bargaining agreements. Antitrust courts
cannot be expected to articulate the same compromise that the
leagues and players' unions ultimately reach through the use
and threatened use of economic weapons in collective bargain-
ing. If, however, antitrust courts required sports leagues to uti-
lize alternative ways to ensure balanced competition with re-
duced restriction of free labor markets, collective bargaining
might have been focused around potential fulcrums of compro-
mise.
The Brown decision does not absolutely preclude the develop-
ment of an antitrust doctrine on the legality of labor market re-
straints in sports leagues outside of baseball; it concludes by
suggesting that some "joint imposition of terms by employers...
could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from
the collective bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust
intervention would not significantly interfere with that pro-
cess."256 Presumably, professional team sport athletes outside
of baseball, therefore, can still free themselves to bring antitrust
challenges to league-imposed labor market restraints by decerti-
fying their union and thereby eliminating any collective bargain-
ing process with which antitrust challenges could interfere."7
The availability of this option is unlikely to help stabilize la-
bor relations in the sports industry for the benefit of fans, how-
ever. Sports unions must deal with a deep, potential conflict of
interest within their bargaining units between the interests of
owners' inputs, including the athletes they hire. See id. at 220-22. Economic theory
also predicts, though, that when competitive buyers collude to act as a monopsonist
("a single buyer of a well-specified good or service," id. at 3) to hold down the price
of an input, the cartel will not pass along its savings to consumers of its products
through expansion. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 12, at 42. Its marginal costs
will not be lower. See id. Indeed, where monopsonists, such as professional sports
leagues, also enjoy a degree of monopoly power in their product markets, the use of
monopsony power in an input market predictably will result in lower product output
and higher consumer prices. This process will occur in the usual case where the mo-
nopsonist confronts an upward sloping labor supply curve that leads to the marginal
factor cost of labor being higher than the wage level. See id. at 41-42.
256. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2127 (1996).
257. All parties certainly made this presumption in the Brown case. See Brief for
Petitioners at 42, Brown (No. 95-388).
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star players and those of average players."8 The former play-
ers are interested primarily in the elimination or reduction of
mobility restraints and salary caps that impair their ability to
negotiate more lucrative contracts. 9 Many of the latter play-
ers, recognizing that they will never achieve star status, may be
more interested in negotiating more attractive collective terms,
such as a more generous pension system, collective revenue
sharing, or higher minimum salaries."e Star players and their
agents may calculate after Brown that unless their union gives
absolute priority in bargaining to their interest in eliminating
labor market restraints that depress the salaries of star
players,"' decertification and the consequent freeing of the an-
titrust weapon would benefit them more than collective bargain-
ing." Any such calculations will make the players' unions'
task in satisfying both parts of their units more difficult. Unpro-
ductive posturing during collective bargaining, and perhaps ex-
tra work stoppages, may result.
It certainly will be more difficult for a players' union, under
the threat of a decertification challenge, to trade agreeing to la-
bor market restraints for enhanced collective benefits.263 More-
over, any decertifications that result from the incentives provid-
ed by the Brown decision also will delay the achievement,
through mature, established collective bargaining, of lasting
258. See Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 398-99 nn.5-8 (1996).
259. See id.
260. See id. Strong empirical evidence shows that the elimination of the traditional
labor market restrictions in the sports industry through collective bargaining has in-
creased the disparity in players' salaries substantially. See QUIRK & FORT, supra
note 239, at 235-39.
261. Certain restraints, such as the fairly generous team salary cap imposed by the
NBA, may allow star players to obtain lucrative contracts, but may restrict the
clubs' capacity to compete for a supporting cast of average players. See infra note
269 and accompanying text.
262. Indeed, after the Williams decision, a number of star NBA players led an ulti-
mately unsuccessful effort to decertify their players' union. See Helyar, supra note
254, at Al. Had the Williams decision, instead, assured the players that their anti-
trust claims could be sacrificed only by their union's agreement to restraints on
their ability to bargain, these players could have fought for their interests inside the
union without threatening decertification.
263. Cf. id. (noting the division among NBA players as a result of decertification
challenge).
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compromise on labor market restraints.2" Not only will bar-
gaining time be lost during decertifications, but collective bene-
fits also may be eliminated or cut back, producing ill will and
suspicions. 65
Even if these predictions about the effect of Brown on labor
peace in the sports industry prove correct, however, the holding
in Brown will not soon be eroded. Even more clearly than Flood
v. Kuhn,266 Brown makes the alignment of antitrust law's
treatment of the union-organized sports labor market with anti-
trust law's treatment of other labor markets dependent on con-
gressional action.26 7 The likelihood of legislative action in the
foreseeable future seems slim.
In order to make a strong case for legislation, the players
would not only have to show an increase in disruptions of team
sports competition, but also carry the difficult burden of correlat-
264. A decertified union might advise a sports league that it is willing to begin
multiemployer bargaining with the league again if the league is willing to waive the
exemption provided by Brown and then only implement restraints agreed to by the
union. The Brown exemption, based on protecting the labor process rather than em-
ployers, see Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996), most likely
would not be waivable. A decertified union might also try bargaining with the
league over acceptable restraints before agreeing to resume its representational sta-
tus. Such bargaining, however, might be treated as itself an acceptance of represen-
tational status.
265. The history of labor relations in the NFL before the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown provided an illustration of how collective bargaining could be disrupted by
a broad exemption's encouragement of union decertification. In 1989, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the NFL could continue to impose re-
straints on player mobility that had been agreed to by the NFLPA even after the
expiration of the agreement for as long as an ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship existed. See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th
Cir. 1989); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. In response, more than 60% of
the players signed a petition revoking the authority of the NFLPA to act as their
bargaining agent, see Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354
n.1 (D. Minn. 1991), and the NFLPA modified its byliws-to eliminate its authority
to bargain with the NFL and advised the League that it would no longer bargain.
See id. at 1354. Soon thereafter, eight players, supported-by the NFLPA, filed anoth-
er antitrust suit against the restrictions challenged in Powell. See id. at 1353-54.
The union did not resume acting as the players' bargaining agent until after settling
this new litigation in 1993. See McCormick, supra note 258, at 417. In the interim,
the NFL was under no legal obligation to continue to grant collective benefits se-
cured by the union in past agreements. See, e.g., Powell, 764 F. Supp. at 1357-59.
266. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
267. Cf supra note 6.
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ing that increase with pressures emanating from Brown. In light
of the political muscle that club owners throughout the country
can flex,2" the support of sports fans would be critical to any
inducement of congressional action. Fans, however, are less and
less likely to sympathize with the plight of athletes whose most
prominent representatives will continue to receive millions of
dollars for work that seems more attractive to many fans than
that in which they themselves toil.
The continuation of extraordinarily high salaries for super-
stars seems likely after Brown, as the threat of decertification
battles and the necessity of maintaining superstars' support of
any work stoppage will continue to require players' unions to
use their bargaining leverage to allow the stars to obtain close to
free market salaries."9 Instead, Brown probably will make it
more difficult for the unions to advance the position of average
players, either through collective benefits or through individual
bargaining free of limitations on aggregate team salaries that
268. Sports clubs, of course, make an economic impact in many states and congres-
sional districts, and club owners have been known to make sizeable campaign contri-
butions. See Jonathan P. Decker, Congress Steps Off Sidelines in Sports Flap: Pro-
Football Team Relocations Spark Hearings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1996,
at 3, available in 1996 WL 5038804 (noting that NFL team owners contributed ap-
proximately $260,000 to congressional campaigns between 1989 and 1995). The play-
ers, by contrast, seem not yet to have been inclined or able to convert their econom-
ic muscle into political power.
269. Team salary caps, such as those extant in the NBA, see Alan M. Levine, Hard
Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for the Professional Sports
League, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243, 245 (1995), and the NFL,
probably will continue to be negotiated. Such caps enable superstars to reap huge
salaries while forcing the clubs to limit the amount of aggregate revenues allocated
to the players by preventing them from also competing for the services of supporting
players. See McCormick, supra note 258, at 398-99 nn.5-8. The Los Angeles Lakers'
signing of Shaquille ONeal to a record $120 million contract after clearing their
roster of several other million dollar players presents a good example of the impact
of an aggregate salary cap on the structure of salaries within a league. See Charles
Stein, Sure Shot or Flagrant Foul? N.BA. Pay Makes Many Roar, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 19, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 6869868.
The new NBA collective bargaining agreement executed in the wake of Williams
and Brown probably enhanced the ability of NBA stars to reap the benefits of com-
petitive bidding for their services by eliminating the teams' rights under the last
agreement to match any offer made to one of their players by another team after
the expiration of the player's first NBA contract. See Peter May, Money to Burn
with Heat, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 1996, at D6, available in 1996 WL 6871078.
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result in most wages paid by clubs being directed toward
stars.27 ' Fans are not likely to focus on the salaries of average
players when assessing the equities of the players' case for law
reform.
In sum, the Brown decision almost certainly will influence
labor relations in the sports industry for a considerable period,
in part because its impact will be bounded and of limited politi-
cal effect. The impact of the failure of the Brown decision to clar-
ify adequately an appropriate basis for the labor exemption is
more uncertain.
On the one hand, reason exists to wonder whether the Brown
Court's articulation of the "intent" of the labor exemption "as
limiting an antitrust court's authority to determine... the ap-
propriate legal limits of industrial conflict,"27' rather than to
advance "the strong labor policy favoring the association of em-
ployees to eliminate competition over wages and working condi-
tions,"272 will lead to a much greater expansion of the exemp-
tion. Might antitrust courts also refuse to review agreements not
to compete for especially talented workers between employers
not engaged in multiemployer bargaining if those employers all
have collective bargaining relationships with the same union? If
so, Brown will have a much greater impact on the entertainment
industry than that suggested above, because unions could not
ensure the preservation of the antitrust protections of repre-
270. The developmental squad players whose salaries the NFL set by employer col-
lusion in Brown present a good illustration of how the Brown decision will make it
much more difficult for the players' unions to protect the salaries of average players.
The Court, in Brown, effectively remitted the NFLPA to its collective bargaining
weapon of a strike or threatened strike to fight the NFL owners' joint imposition of
the $1000 a week salary. NFL star players, conscious of how short-lived their ca-
reers are likely to be, probably will not be willing even to consider sacrificing part
of their high salaries to fight for the freedom of marginal players to bargain individ-
ually for their salaries.
By contrast, the NFLPA was willing to fight for the developmental squad play-
ers through antitrust litigation to preserve the principle that all individual player
salaries should be subject to negotiation. The need to maintain solidarity in the un-
ion around this principle presumably discouraged the NFLPA from trading the limit-
ed, individual bargaining leverage of the developmental squad players for more free-
dom for star players.
271. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120.
272. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975).
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sented employees by refusing to agree to multiemployer bargain-
ing."' Might antitrust courts also refuse to review even em-
ployer restraints on product market competition that are im-
posed through use of the collective bargaining process? If so,
Brown will have led to the repudiation of the basic limitation on
the labor exemption established in Pennington and Jewel
Tea.
274
273. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
274. That this is not a totally fanciful prospect is suggested by a recent decision of
the Seventh Circuit authored by Judge Easterbrook, Ehredt Underground, Inc. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 90 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 685
(1997). Relying on the language, rather than the holding, of Brown, Easterbrook held
exempt from antitrust review a trenching contractor's agreement with a major pur-
chaser of its services that the purchaser would require a competitor of the contractor
to use labor represented by the same union that represented the contractor's em-
ployees. See id. at 241. The contractor desired such an agreement because its con-
tract with the union included a "most-favored-nation" clause under which the union
agreed to provide the contractor with the benefit of any more favorable contract
signed with a competitor. See id. at 239. The contractor wanted assurance that its
competitor would not underbid it because of lower labor costs. See id. Even though
the contractor designed the challenged agreement to protect its product market, and
even though the facts of the case were similar in important respects to those of
Pennington and Connell, see supra text accompanying notes 46 and 56, Easterbrook
concluded that Brown was controlling without any analysis of the two prior cases or
of the distinction of product market versus labor market restraints on which the
Court based these cases and Jewel Tea. See Ehredt, 90 F.3d at 240-41.
Pennington, in fact, could have been distinguished in Ehredt. The contractor's
agreement with its major purchaser protected the contractor in its product market
only by perfecting the union's control of the labor market. See id. at 239. It thus
advanced the labor law policy of allowing employees to associate in order to elimi-
nate competition over wages. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. Unlike the challenged
provision in the collective agreement in Pennington, which required the union to im-
pose certain terms on competitive employers, rather than just requiring the union to
grant equal terms to all employers, see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 660 (1964), the 'most-favored-nation" clause in Ehredt did not restrict
the ability of the union to achieve labor market control. See Ehredt, 90 F.3d at 239.
Easterbrook would have had more difficulty distinguishing Connell. The restraint
held subject to antitrust scrutiny in Connell, similar to the restraint in Ehredt, com-
mitted a purchaser of construction services to use only labor represented by a partic-
ular union. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 618-19. The fact that a particular contractor
secured the commitment in Ehredt to protect its product market, see Ehredt, 90 F.3d
at 239, in contrast with the union-secured commitment in Connell, see Connell, 381
U.S. at 659-61, makes Ehredt seem an even more appropriate case for antitrust
scrutiny. In my view, the Connell decision improperly restricted a legitimate union
attempt to achieve labor market control, but the decision presumably remains good
law. The use of Brown in Ehredt suggests that Judge Easterbrook would find ex-
empt any product market restraint that "stemmed directly from a collective bargain-
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On the other hand, reason remains to hope that Brown will
not be the last word from the Court on the labor exemption.
Brown easily could be limited to the protection of multiemployer
bargaining and its effects, and thus primarily confined to the
sports industry. The Court's prior doctrine on the labor exemp-
tion could still be formulated coherently as suggested above. As
could have been said after Flood v. Kuhn,275 it may be better
that appropriate doctrine be tainted by an anomaly than that
the doctrine be forsaken totally.
ing agreement." Ehredt, 90 F.3d at 241.
For another broad, though defensible, use of the Brown decision to exempt a
multiemployer association's boycott of independent employers who entered into collec-
tive bargaining agreements with a union striking the multiemployer association, see
Sage Realty Corp. v. ISS Cleaning Serv. Group, 936 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
275. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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